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ABSTRACT
Marriage has become controversial. Some experts argue that marriage is
fundamental and foundational. In their view, the decline of marriage lies at the
heart of a wide range of social problems; these experts urge state efforts to revive
marriage and promote marital commitment. Other experts argue that marriage is
merely a label; in their view, the state should not only eschew marriage promotion,
but abandon marriage regulation altogether.
Both the pro- and anti-marriage perspectives have attracted adherents among
policymakers. In the United States, the Bush administration has recently launched
an initiative in support of "healthy marriages" that builds on earlier welfare-
reform legislation designed to promote marriage among the poor. In Canada,
Parliament has revised both tax and old-age pension rules so that the same
standards apply to married and "common-law" partners; the Canadian Law
Reform Commission has also recommended comprehensive revision of Canadian
law to avoid "problems of coherence " arising from marital status classifications.
Which approach is preferable? This paper analyzes the growing body of
social science evidence that bears on marriage regulation and makes policy
recommendations based on that evidence. It concludes that both the advocates and
opponents of marriage have overstated their claims: the research data
demonstrate that classifications based on marriage are sometimes desirable and
sometimes not: they show that formal, ceremonial marriage provides public
benefits by clearly denoting the intention to assume relational responsibilities;
they show that enduring, low-conflict marriage provides larger public benefits
through its positive impact on the health, wealth and happiness of spouses and
their children; they show that conflicted and short-term marriage does not offer
personal benefits to either adult partners or their children. Finally--ironically--
the data suggest that government is more likely to effectively promote low-conflict,
enduring marriage through policies aimed at curbing the disadvantages associated
with nonmarriage and marital dysfunction than it is through policies, like those
favored by marriage advocates, that seek to promote marriage directly.
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for.this article was supported by Brooklyn
Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
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Love and marriage, love and
marriage
Go together like a horse and
carriage. 1
What societal purposes
could.. marriage serve in a no-
fault, prenuptial, gender-
egalitarian world? Shouldn't
private lives be left to private
ordering... ?2
INTRODUCTION
Marriage, once linked to love and commitment as routinely as horse to
carriage, has become controversial. Some experts argue that the married state is
fundamental and foundational. As they see it, "[t]he erosion of marriage during the
past four decades... lies at the heart of many of the social problems with which the
government currently grapples," and "government policy [thus] should
promote... healthy marriage."3 Others see marriage as nothing more than a label,
and an old-fashioned label at that. These experts argue that the state should not
only eschew marriage promotion, but abandon marriage regulation altogether.
Citing declining rates of marriage and marital birth-the very same factors that
lead marriage advocates to urge promotion strategies-these commentators argue
that tax obligations, government benefits, and even spousal rights and duties
should be based on relational facts rather than marital status. They urge "social
policies that facilitate maximum economic well-being and emotional flourishing
SAMMY CAHN, LOVE AND MARRIAGE (Maraville Music Corp. 1955).
2 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS:
QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29, 29-30 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006).
3 ROBERT E. RECTOR & MELISSA G. PARDUE, HERITAGE FOUND., UNDERSTANDING THE
PRESIDENT'S HEALTHY MARRIAGE INITIATIVE passism (2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Fami
ly/bg 174 1 .cfi; see also DAVID POPENOE, WAR OVER THE FAMILY passim (2005); MILTON J. REGAN,
JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE passim (1999); MILTON J. REGAN, JR.,
FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY passim (1993); LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER,
THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF
FINANCIALLY passim (2000); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How OUR CULTURE HAS
WEAKENED FAMILIES passim (2002); Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of
Constitutional Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349 passim (2003).
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for all"4 and question whether state-sanctioned marriage should even "survive
these reforms as a kinship form."
5
Both the pro- and anti-marriage perspectives have attracted the attention of
policy makers. U.S. policymakers have thus far stressed marriage promotion.
Nineteen ninety-six welfare-reform legislation that provided incentives to the
states to increase two-parent families and reduce nonmarital childbearing was
based on an underlying marriage-promotion policy. 6 More recently, the Bush
administration has launched an initiative designed to support "healthy" marriages
by providing funds for marriage-skills education and reducing tax and benefit.
"penalties" that might deter marriage.7 Many of the states have also launched their
own marriage-promotion initiatives.8
Across the Canadian border, the policy trend has been quite different. The
Canadian Parliament has revised both tax and old-age pension rules so that the
same standards apply to married and "common-law" partners. 9 More recently, the
Canadian Law Reform Commission has recommended comprehensive legal reform
to avoid "problems of coherence" arising from marital status classifications.10 A
number of other nations have adopted one or another feature of the Canadian
approach,' 1 and New Zealand has gone so far as to extend all of the personal rights
and obligations that flow from marriage to couples who have been "de facto
partners" for three years. 12
4 Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 227 (2003);
see also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP passim
(1992); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY passim
(2004); JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE
POSTMODERN AGE passim (1996); Mary L. Shanley, Afterword to JUST MARRIAGE 109passim (Joshua
Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004); Fineman, supra note 2, at 57-63.
5 Wendy Brown, After Marriage, in JUST MARRIAGE 87, 88 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah
Chasman eds., 2004).
6 The preamble to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, P.L. 104-193, declares that "(1) Marriage is the foundation of a successful society. (2)
Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of children.
(3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and
the well-being of children." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
7 See U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTHY MARRIAGE INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov /healthymarriage/about/mission.html.
8 See Rick Lyman, Trying to Strengthen an "I Do" with a More Binding Legal Tie, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2005, at Al, A16 (reporting that "40 states have provided at least some money to provide
couples with marriage-related services...," and that nine states offer welfare recipients a financial
incentive to marry, six train county extension agents to offer marriage-related services, and five
reduce the marriage license fee for those who get premarital counseling).
9 See LAW REFORM COMM. OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), at ch. 3, pt. 2, Application, § VII, "The Income Tax
Act" at C [hereinafter BEYOND CONJUGALITY], available at http:/epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/lcc-
cdc/beyondcConjugality-e/html/front-e.html.
10 See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 2, Coherence.
I1 See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REv. 817, 817-19 (2005) (describing legal developments).
12 See Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001, No. 5 (N.Z.), http://gpacts.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/2001/an/005.html; see also Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried
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Across nations, the marriage question has typically been debated in terms of
morals and values. On one side, the pro-marriage group calls for "a
restigmatization of illegitimacy and promiscuity" 13 and contends that virtually all
social ills, including "[t]he drug crisis, the education crisis, the problems of teen
pregnancy and juvenile crime" can be traced "to one source: broken families."'' 4
On the other, the anti-marriage forces deplore efforts to revitalize marriage not
only as "moralistic" and "atavistic," but as signs of "denial, resistance,
displacement, and bad faith... ."" Although there is a large and growing body of
social science research relevant to the marriage debate, advocates on both sides
have tended to selectively seize on evidence that supports their point of view or
simply to ignore the evidence altogether.
16
This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the debate over marriage is much
too important to leave to the ideologues. State marriage policy has implications for
a wide range of important and controversial issues, including same-sex marriage
and the legal treatment of cohabitants. State marriage policy may also affect
marriage decision making; because the marital unit has long served as a
fundamental social building block, policy changes should be undertaken with great
care. Second, ideological debate speaks only to the converted and thus obscures
common ground. Evidence-based argument, on the other hand, enhances the
possibility of meaningful dialogue; this kind of public conversation has the "large
advantage of allowing a convergence on particular outcomes by people unable to
reach an accord on general principles."' 17 It promotes the development of family,
policies capable of garnering broad public support and allegiance.' 8
In this paper, I attempt to provide a full and neutral review of the social
science evidence on the claimed benefits of marriage, the desirability of marital-
status classifications, and the feasibility of effective marriage promotion. I do so
not as a proponent or opponent of marriage, but as a family law expert committed
to a coherent, evidence-based family policy.' 9
I conclude that proponents and opponents of marriage are both right-and
that they are both wrong. In contrast to the stark picture painted by the advocates,
the data demonstrate that classifications based on marriage are sometimes desirable
Cohabitation-The New Zealand Response, 37 FAM. L. Q. 303 (2003) (detailing legislative reforms
that place married and unmarried couples on similar footing in property and succession matters).
13 Leon R. Kass, The End of Courtship 7 (1997), available at http://www.boundless.org/2005/a
rticles/a0001161.cfm (Part 3 of 3).
14 STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA'S
CHANGING FAMILIES 6 (1997) (quotations omitted).
15 STACEY, supra note 4, at 11, 143.
16 See infra Section III(A).
17 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 39-40 (1996).
18 See generally AmY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996)
(describing conditions that produce fruitful democratic debate).
19 I have consistently advocated an "interpretive" approach that aims at coherent, evidence-
based family law. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835, 842-43 (2000); Marsha Garrison,
Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REv. 41,
46-47 (1998).
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and sometimes not; they show that good marriages provide public benefits, but that
bad marriages do not; they show that many of the proposals to promote marriage
are more likely to promote the wrong sort of marriage than the right sort. Perhaps
most surprisingly, the data shows that state policies aimed at the disadvantages
associated with nonmarriage and marital failure-policies that have thus far found
far more favor with marriage opponents than advocates-are far more likely to
effectively promote marriage than are the marriage promotion initiatives advocates
have touted.
Part Two describes the decline of marriage. Part Three considers why
policymakers might care: it analyzes the claim that the decline in marriage makes
classifications based on marital status unfair and undesirable and describes the
range of public benefits that might justify state efforts to revive marriage rates and
evaluates their relative importance. It concludes that only low-conflict, enduring
marital unions provide demonstrable benefits to adult partners and their children; it
also finds that formal, ceremonial marriage offers a certain and efficient method of
registering relational intentions that cannot be obtained through informal
mechanisms. Part Four evaluates the most popular pro-marriage initiatives in light
of these findings.
I. THE DECLINE-AND RESILIENCE-OF MARRIAGE
An important reason why marriage is controversial is that it is in decline. All
across the industrialized world, young adults are marrying later2° and increasing
numbers may not marry at all. 21 Those who do marry face a relatively high
probability that their relationships will terminate in divorce. 22 As a result of these
20 Between 1950 and 2002, the median age at first marriage increased for U.S. men by 4.1 years
and for women by 5 years. See U.S. Census Bureau, Median Age at First Marriage, by Sex: 1890 to
the Present [2006] (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-
fam/ms2.xls; see also Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on Union Formation, in THE TIES
THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 40, 41 tbl.3.1 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000)
(reporting increase in age of first marriage in most European nations); J. Sean Curtin, Japanese
Marriage Trends in 2002: Later Unions and More Divorce Families, SOC. TRENDS: SERIES No. 9, 1-
2 (2002), available at http://unpan 1 .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/JNPAN0166
35.pdf (reporting "all time high" in Japanese age at first marriage in 2002).
21 Between 1970 and 2002, the proportion of U.S. adults age 40-44 who reported that they had
never been married increased among men from 4.9% to 16.7% and among women from 6.3% to
11.5%. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract: Marriages and Divorces, available at http://ww
w.census.gov/compendia/statab/past-years.html; see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2001 59 tbl.68 [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (showing that,
betweenl950 and 1996, the U.S. marriage rate declined from 11.1 to 8.8 per 1000 population);
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES IN THE EU (1960-95), available at http://www.eurohealth.ie/newrep/socio
.htm (showing average decline, between 1960 and 1995, of 24% in marriage rate of fifteen European
nations).
22 See RODERICK PHILLIPS, UNTYING THE KNOT 200-22 (1991) (comparing U.S. and European
divorce rates from mid-nineteenth century through mid-1980s); David T. Ellwood & Christopher
Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the United States Since 1960, in THE FUTURE OF THE
FAMILY 25, 34 fig 2.3 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) (showing U.S. divorce rates from 1920
-2000); James M. Raymo et al., Marital Dissolution in Japan: Recent Trends and Patterns, 11
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convergent trends, today's adults spend, on average, a smaller proportion of their
adult lives within a marital household than did their ancestors.2 3
With the notable exceptions of Asia and southern Europe, marital
relationships are in decline not only for adults, but also for children. The
proportion of children born outside of marriage has skyrocketed,24 and even
children born within marital relationships face increased risk of parental divorce or
separation As a result of these convergent trends, children are increasingly likely
to live in a single-parent household or a reconstituted household consisting of one
parent, that parent's new partner, and perhaps children from the partner's prior
relationship; the average amount of time that they spend living with both biological
parents has significantly diminished.
With the decline in marriage and marital childbearing has come a marked
increase in nonmarital cohabitation. In the United States, the last forty years have
produced a ten-fold increase in the number of cohabiting couples, 26 and many
Western European nations have seen comparable or even larger increases in this
household type.27 Increasingly, cohabitation precedes marriage 28 and, in the event
of divorce, follows it as well.29
Despite these trends, it would be premature to write an obituary for marriage.
In the United States, some ninety percent of adults in mid-life have been or are
DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 395-99 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.demographic-research.org
(describing the rising Japanese divorce rate).
23 See STEVE RAWLINGS, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES 1-2, available at http://www.census.gov/p
pulation/www/pop-profile/hhfam.html (reporting U.S. census data showing that, between 1970 and
2004, the proportion of U.S. households that included a married couple declined from 70.6% to
54%).
24 See Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United
States 1940-99, 48 NAT. VITAL STATISTICS RPT. No. 16, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/n
vsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf (reporting that 33.8% of U.S. births were nonmarital in 2002, compared to
3.8% in 1940); Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The Challenge of Family System Changes for Research
and Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 1, 8 fig.1.3 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004)
(showing increases in European nonmarital birth rates between 1960 and 2000).
25 See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 22, at 32-33, figs. 2.1, 2.2.
26 Between 1970 and 2000, the number of U.S. unmarried-cohabitant households rose from
523,000 to 4,880,000. See JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUR-EAU, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS P20-537, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS 2000, at 2-6 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-
537.pdf.
27 See Kiernan, supra note 20, at 50-51 tbl.3.4 (showing increases in premarital cohabitation in
two different age cohorts across fourteen European nations).
28 See Kathleen Kiernan, Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood: Here to Stay? European
Perspectives, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 66, 68-69 & fig.3.1 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds.,
2004) (comparing marriage rates in U.S. and ten European nations and concluding that "by the early
1990s cohabitation had eclipsed marriage as the marker for entry into first union in many Western
countries.").
29 See M.D. BRAMLETT & W.D. MOSHER, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 20-21 figs.20-23 (2002) (reporting that in 1995 the probability
of women cohabitating after marriage was 53% within five years and 70% within ten years).
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married; 30 demographers estimate that virtually the same number of women in their
31twenties and thirties will marry at some point. While the United States is perhaps
the most marriage-prone industrialized society today, marriage rates have recently
stabilized or increased in a number of European nations, and some experts believe
that Europeans are simply marrying later than they did previously.32 It is possible
that cohabitation is delaying, but not necessarily replacing, marriage.
The decline of marriage and marital child-bearing is also disproportionately
concentrated in less privileged segments of the population. College-educated
women were once less likely to marry than others; this is no longer the case33 and,
at least in the United States, these well-educated women are equally or more likely
to stay married than they were several decades ago.34 In the United States and, to a
lesser extent, some European nations, nonmarital fertility is also concentrated
among the poorly educated.3 About a quarter of U.S. women without a high
school degree have had children but never married; only about three percent of
college-educated women have done so. 36 These statistics reflect the fact that
"highly educated women are postponing both marriage and childbearing, while
30 See R.M. KREIDER & J.M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
P70-80, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: FALL 1996, at 17 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf
31 See LYNNE M. CASPER & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 39-40 (2002); The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for
the United States, 1995, 27 Pop. & DEVELOPMENT REV. 553, 553-63 (2001) (showing that, between
1988 and 1995, the proportion of persons surviving to age fifteen who would ever marry remained
fairly steady, at about five out of six of men and seven out of eight of women).
32 See Peter Ford, In Europe, Marriage Is Back, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 10, 2002 at P1,
S3 (reporting increase in marriage rate in Britain, France, and Germany and quoting a French
demographer urging that, "[i]n the end the number of marriages each generation won't change that
much..
33 See Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney, Marriage Delayed or Marriage Forgone?
New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriagefor U.S. Women, 66 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 506, 506, 509-10
(2001).
34 See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 22, at 25, 39-40 fig.2.2, 42-43 fig.2.11 (reporting
marriage as equally likely); David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single
Parent Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Lookfor Answers?, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 3,
13-14 figs.1.4, 1.5 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) (showing historical data on single motherhood
by education level); Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It's Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2005, at D7 (reporting unpublished data showing that the ten-year divorce rate for college graduates
"has plummeted to just over 16% of those married between 1990 and 1994 from 27% of those
married between 1975 and 1979").
35 See Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on Nonmarital Childbearing, in OUT OF
WEDLOCK: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF NONMARITAL FERTILITY 77, 90 tbl.3.5 (Lawrence L. Wu
& Barbara Wolfe eds., 2004) (showing higher proportion of nonmarital first births to nongraduates in
four of nine European nations).
36 See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 22, at 41-42 fig.2.9; see also Larry Bumpass & H.H. Lu,
Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children 's Family Contexts in the United States, 54
POPULATION STUD. 29, 32-34 (2000) (reporting that U.S. college-educated women produce less than
5% of U.S. nonmarital births).
2008]
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less-educated women are postponing marriage but not childbearing." 37 Because of
these divergent trends, in the mid-1990s, only ten percent of the children of U.S.
college-educated women lived in single-parent households-a percentage that has
not increased since 1980-as compared to more than forty percent of children
whose mothers lacked a high-school diploma.38
Marital and reproductive behavior also diverges sharply by race and ethnicity.
In the United States, the decline of marriage .has been much more pronounced
among black than white Americans. African-Americans have long had a high rate
of marital disruption,39 but they are now much less likely to marry, too. Slightly
more than two-thirds of black women born between 1960 and 1964 married by age
40, compared to eighty-seven percent of those born two decades earlier. But while
far more white than black women have married by age 40, more black than white
women have had children.40 Indeed, sixty-eight percent of black children are now
born outside of marriage, compared to twenty-eight percent of non-Hispanic white
children.41 White nonmarital births are also concentrated among cohabiting
couples, while black nonmarital births instead are concentrated among "visiting"
couples who do not share a residence42and who are much less likely than
cohabitants to marry after their child's birth or even to remain a couple.43 As a
37 Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 22, at 41; see also K.A. Musick, Planned and Unplanned
Childbearing Among Unmarried Women, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 915 (2002) (reporting that
education level and socioeconomic status are among the best predictors of nonmarital birth).
38 See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 22, at 36-39 fig.2.7. About 60% of marriages of women
without high school degrees and 33% of marriages of college graduates end in separation or divorce.
See Kelly Raley & Larry Bumpass, The Topography of the Divorce Plateau: Levels and Trends in
Union Stability in the United States after 1980, 8 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 245, 249-56 (2003).
39 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD 60-62 (1998) (showing marital disruption
rates by ethnicity); WILSON, supra note 3, at 114-15 (reporting historical data on African-American
marital disruption rates and noting that in earlier periods some unmarried mothers "reported
themselves as widows in order to explain why they had a child but not a husband"); Ellwood &
Jencks, supra note 22, at 42 fig.2.10 (showing marital disruption rates of mothers by ethnicity);
Steven P. Martin, Women's Education and Family Timing, in Soc. INEQUALITY 108, figs.2.17, 2.18
(Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) (showing marriage and birth rates for black women between 1940
and 1995).
40 See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 22, at 40-41 fig.2.8 (reporting that, at age 40, 89% of
white and 68% of black women are married and 80% of white and 85% of black women have had
children).
41 See U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2004-05
60, tbl.71, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-2001_2005.html
(showing that variation by race is even larger for first births; 74% of the first births of non-Hispanic
white women are marital, as compared to 23% of first births to black women); ANJANI CHANDRA ET
AL., FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE
2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH fig.5 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data
/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.
42 See Cynthia Osborne, Marriage Following the Birth of a Child Among Cohabiting and
Visiting Parents, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 14, 20-21 tbl.1 (2005) (reporting that 64.5% of visiting
mothers, 13% of married mothers, and 31% of cohabiting mothers were black while 45% of married,
23% of cohabiting and 8% of visiting mothers were white).
43 See Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and the Marriage Agenda 7, tbl.5 (Bendheim-
Thomas Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing at Princeton Univ., Working Paper 03-16-FF, 2003),
available at http://www.csbs.utah.edu/siciliano-forum/anthologies/2003Forum.pdf (finding that 21%
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result of these various trends, black children spend much more time than white
children in single-parent families. Indeed, the chance of a black child growing up
with both parents was higher during slavery than it is today. 4
Despite these racial and socioeconomic differences, marriage remains an
important life goal for most Americans. Overwhelmingly, young Americans assert
that they would be "more economically secure, have more emotional security, a
better sex life, and a higher standard of living" if they were married.45 They report
that they plan to marry themselves and say that a good marriage is an important
component of a good life.46 This enthusiasm for marriage has not declined. Annual
surveys of high school seniors conducted since the late 1970s show virtually
identical percentages reporting that "having a good marriage and family life" is
extremely important; the proportion of young men reporting that they plan to
marry has actually increased.47 Support for marriage is high within all ethnic and
racial groups,48 and those who cohabit seem to be just as enthusiastic as the general
population. In a 1994 national survey, more than ninety percent of cohabiting
respondents reported that they planned to marry at some point.49 Even those who
have children outside of marriage report a strong belief in marital relationships. In-
hospital surveys of unmarried parents consistently find that a substantial majority
of respondents agree with the statement "marriage is better for children;" 50
of cohabiting couples and 11% of visiting but "romantically involved" couples had married by the
time of their child's third birthday, while 10% of married, 38% of cohabiting, and 51% of "visiting"
couples had separated by this birthday); see also Osborne, supra note 42, at 21 (reporting that
different variables predict marriage for visitors and cohabitants).
44 See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 110 (rev. ed. 1992).
45 See Kelly Raley, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation, in THE TIES
THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 19, at 34 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000)
(reporting that most adults age 20-29 say that they would be happier, "more economically secure,
have more emotional security, a better sex life, and a higher standard of living if they were married");
Arland Thornton & L. Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes toward Family Issues
in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1009, 1009 (2001)
(concluding that young Americans continue to favor marriage).
46 See Thornton & Young-DeMarco, supra note 45, at 1018 (stating that about 80% of young
women and 78% of young men report that they plan to marry).
47 See Thornton & Young-DeMarco, supra note 45. See also William G. Axinn & Arland
Thornton, The Transformation in the Meaning of Marriage, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES
ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 147, 151-52 tbl.8.1 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000) (reporting survey
data from 1970s-90s on attitudes toward marriage).
48 See M. Belinda Tucker, Marital Values and Expectations in Context, in THE TIES THAT BIND:
PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 166, 177-80 & tbl.9.3 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000)
(reporting marital value means by gender and ethnicity).
49 See John D. Cunningham & John K. Antill, Cohabitation and Marriage: Retrospective and
Predictive Comparisons, 11 J. Soc. & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 77, 77 (1994); see also Andrew J.
Cherlin, Toward a New Home Socioeconomics of Union Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND:
PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 116, 135 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000) ("The typically
short durations [of cohabitation] in the United States, along with expressed preferences for marriage,
suggest that marriage is still the goal for most young adults and cohabitation is still seen as an
intermediate status.").
50 See GREGORY Acs & HEATHER KOBALL, URBAN INST., TANF AND THE STATUS OF TEEN
MOTHERS UNDER AGE 18 fig.7 (2003) (on file with author) (reporting that over 80% of unmarried
mothers and 90% of unmarried fathers agreed with this statement); Kathryn Edin et al., A Peek Inside
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overwhelmingly, they report that their own chances of marriage are at least even or
better.51 This positive attitude is expressed almost as strongly in interviews
conducted several months later, and about half of these parents also indicate that
they "might be interested" in a marriage-promotion program. 2 Although these
young parents rarely do marry each other,53 their enthusiasm for the married state
remains strong.
III. DOES THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE MATTER?
Why should policymakers care about the decline of marriage? After all,
household organization has changed dramatically in other ways that elicit barely a
murmur. As compared to a century ago, relatively few households employ
servants, particularly resident servants. The likelihood that a household will be
multi-generational has also declined, along with typical household size.
One reason policymakers might care is because marital status has been used
to determine eligibility for a wide range of state-determined obligations and
benefits. If marriage no longer signals a meaningful difference between
households, policymakers would want to rethink these classificatory schemes.
Policymakers should also care if marriage were associated with various public
benefits that would be reduced when marriage declines. Unsurprisingly, these dual
concerns lie behind the arguments of both those who advocate marriage promotion
and those who favor marriage demotion. Part A of this section will address the
classification issues, and Part B will examine the question of public benefits.
A. Is Marriage Relevant to Legitimate Legislative Goals?
1. Is Cohabitation the Equivalent of Marriage?
Some commentators have argued that the decline of marriage signals its
growing irrelevance. For example, the Canadian Law Reform Commission
contends that unmarried cohabitants "may have many of the characteristics of
economic and emotional interdependency" that characterize marital relationships
the Black Box: What Marriage Means for Poor Unmarried Parents, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007,
1010 (reporting that two-thirds of surveyed new unmarried mothers and three-quarters of new
unmarried fathers agreed with this statement).
51 See Acs & KOBALL, supra note 50, at 17 (reporting that a majority said their chances of
marriage were "good or almost certain"); Christina Gibson et al., High Hopes But Even Higher
Expectations: The Retreat from Marriage among Low-Income Couples, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
1301, 1306 (2003) (reporting that, in a nationally representative survey, 79% of unmarried mothers
and 84% of unmarried fathers living together at child's birth say that there is at least a "good or
certain" chance that they will marry); see also KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN
KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 131 (2005) (reporting that 70% of
surveyed poor unmarried mothers "clearly want to marry" and 26% "are making marriage plans
now").
52 See Acs & KOBALL, supra note 50, at 17; McLanahan, supra note 43, at 7.
53 See McLanahan, supra note 43, at 7, tbl.5.
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and that marital-status classifications thus cannot provide a fair method of sorting
among couples: 54 it argues that, "when legislatures "use[] terms like 'spouse' as a
proxy for identifying the kinds of close personal relationships between adults to
which such laws apply, problems of coherence arise. 55
The Law Reform Commission's claim hints at the possibility that declining
marriage rates and rising levels of cohabitation evidence no more than a shift in
marital norms: demographers who count marriages can record only those formally
registered with the state, but informal marriage-one recognized as a marriage by
the community and the couple but not formally registered-undoubtedly antedates
formal marriage by many thousands of years and, in some societies, it still
represents the rule instead of the exception. In New Zealand and Australia, for
example, formal marriage is "culturally alien" to the native Aborigine and Maori
populations, who typically enter into informal marital unions;56 scholars have also
reported a high incidence of informal marriage in Latin America.57 It is possible
that the rise of cohabitation and decline of formal marriage represent nothing more
than a shift in marriage behavior, in which informal marital unions like those
prevalent among these native and rural populations have become the norm in
modem, industrialized society.
The research evidence does not support this supposition, however. Instead, it
demonstrates that cohabitants and married couples differ markedly on a wide
variety of dimensions.58
First, for most couples, cohabitation is brief and transitional. In the United
States, approximately sixty percent of all cohabitants and seventy percent of those
in a first premarital cohabitation marry within five years.59 More tellingly, only
about ten percent of cohabitants who do not marry are still together five years
later.60 By contrast, eighty percent of first marriages survive at least five years and
5' BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 3, Part I Methodology, Sec.4.
55 Id.; see also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 6.02
comment A (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (arguing that "the absence of formal marriage may
have little or no bearing on the character of the parties' domestic relationship and on the equitable
considerations that underlie claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution of a marriage.").
56 See Keo Dempsey & David de Vaus, Who Cohabits in 2001? The Significance of Age,
Gender, Religion and Ethnicity, 40 AuS. J. Soc. 157, 170 (2004).
57 See Teresa Castro Martin, Consensual Unions in Latin America: Persistence of a Dual
Nuptuality System, 33 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 35, 35 (2002) (noting that in some places the rate of
informal "consensual marriage" exceeds traditional marital rates, especially for young couples).
58 1 have reviewed this evidence in greater detail in Garrison, supra note 11, at 839-48. See also
Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the ALI's Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING
THE FAMILY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
(Robin H. Wilson ed., 2006).
59 See BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 29, at 12, tbl 9. However, the likelihood that
cohabitation will lead to marriage is declining. See Larry L. Bumpass, The Changing Significance of
Marriage in the United States, in THE CHANGING FAMILY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ASIA AND
THE UNITED STATES 63, 71 (K.O. Mason et al. eds., 1998).
60 See Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research Themes,
Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3 (2000) (summarizing research); see also
BRAMLETr & MOSHER, supra note 29, at 22, tbl.15 (reporting that 49% of first premarital
cohabitations are disrupted within five years).
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two-thirds survive for at least ten years.61 Cohabitation thus tends to be a
comparatively short-lived state that, for most couples, represents only a brief way-
station on the road to marriage or separation. Indeed, the median duration of
cohabitation in the United States now appears to be less than 1.5 years. 62
Second, cohabitants do not typically adopt the relational norms associated
with marriage. Cohabitants are much less likely than married couples to have
children, demonstrate sexual fidelity, pool their resources, experience security or
feel unconflicted in their relationships.63 They are more likely than married couples
to value independence and less likely to value commitment or express commitment
toward their partners.64
These contrasting behaviors and attitudes reflect the fact that, at least in the
United States, cohabitation is usually seen, not as a substitute for being married,
but for being single. More than ninety percent of U.S. cohabiting respondents
report that they plan to marry at some point, 65 and about three-quarters of
cohabitants report the belief that they will eventually marry their current partner.
66
But cohabitants do not report that their relationships are already marital. In a U.S.
cohabitant survey conducted during the late 1980s, only ten percent of respondents
reported that cohabitation was a "substitute for marriage," while sixty-one percent
said that it was a precursor to or "trial" period for assessing marital compatibility,
and twenty-nine percent described it as a form of co-residential dating. Two
recent U.S. surveys suggest that today's cohabitants are even less marriage-minded
than those in this earlier generation: in a small survey of New York City
cohabitants, respondents overwhelmingly reported finances, convenience, and
housing needs as the reasons for their decisions to cohabit;68 in a larger
Midwestern survey, none of the cohabitant interviewees indicated that cohabitation
represented a marital commitment. As one cohabitant put it, the decision to cohabit
meant that: "I wasn't ready... to get like, I mean, that close to, somebody and I
mean I lived with her but we still had our freedom we still let each other do what
we wanted to do so I had my space and she had her space. 69 Unsurprisingly, the
61 BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 29, at 17-18 tbl.2 1.
62 See Patrick Heuveline & Jeffrey M. Timberlake, The Role of Cohabitation in Family
Formation: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1214, 1223 tbl.2
(2004). Nor is the average duration of U.S. cohabitation increasing. See Cherlin, supra note 49, at
135 (summarizing evidence).
63 See Garrison, supra note 11, at 840-41 (summarizing evidence).
64 See id. at 841-43 (summarizing evidence).
65 See Cunningham & Antill, supra note 49, at 77; see also Cherlin, supra note 49, at 135.
66 Although the percentage of cohabitants who report the belief that they will eventually marry
their current partner has declined, about three-quarters say that they will do so. Cf Susan L. Brown &
Alan Booth, Cohabitation Versus Marriage: A Comparison or Relationship Quality, 58 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 668, 673 (1996); Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, First Comes Cohabitation, Then
Comes Marriage, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 1065, 1973 tbl.1 (2002).
67 See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 31, at 59 tbt.2.5.
68 See Sharon Sassier, The Process of Entering into Cohabiting Unions, 66 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 491,498-501 (2004).
69 Wendy Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation: New
Perspectives from Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 999 (2005).
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researchers concluded that "[t]he process of deciding to cohabit... appears to
differ in important ways from processes determining entry into marriage.
70
Even the arrival of a child does not appear to alter the feeling that
cohabitation is fundamentally different from marriage. The U.S. Fragile Family
Study, which sponsored in-depth interviews of a nationally representative group of
unmarried parents, found that interviewees sharply distinguished marriage from
their current living arrangements. The researchers report that "most of these
cohabiting pairs espouse a strong individualistic ethic. .. in which personal
happiness and fulfillment hold the highest value., 71 They offer two quotes from
cohabitants that
illustrate this ethos particularly well, and describe how sharply
cohabitation differs from marriage. The first tells us, "Most people feel
like with their boyfriend or girlfriend, when they get into an argument
they can just leave. Most of them feel like, OK, when you're married
you can't just walk away and leave like that." The second says, "With
me and Victor, we have a commitment. But he can still decide this is
not working for [him]. But if you go as far as getting married, there you
need to know you're really with the person.72
The interviewees overwhelmingly reported the desire to marry and plans to do
so.
73 But they did not think that marriage was only a piece of paper. Far from it,
they saw marriage as a fundamental shift in commitment and relational values.
Although most of the research evidence comes from the United States, reports
from Canada, the Pacific, and Western Europe, show similar patterns. Here, too,
cohabitation tends to be a comparatively short-lived state that is much less likely
than marriage to produce children or to induce resource pooling. It does not
demonstrate rejection of formal marriage, as many cohabitants report that they are
likely to ultimately marry their partners.74
Obviously, cohabitation sometimes represents informal marriage; it always
has and probably always will. It is possible that the recent extraordinary increase in
cohabitation has produced either a significant overall increase in informal marriage
or a significant increase within certain nations or population groups. We lack
definitive evidence on these points, and the data show significant cross-national
variation not only in the likelihood of cohabitation, but also in. its duration,
association with childbearing, and likelihood of terminating in marriage. Indeed,
surveying the data, demographers have enumerated six or seven different
cohabitational "types," ranging from a substitute for being single-that type that
seems most prevalent in the United States-to a stage in the marriage process, to
70 Id. at 1000.
71 Edin et al., supra note 50, at 1011 (emphasis in original).
72 Id.
73 See id. and sources cited supra notes 50-5 1.
74 See Garrison, supra note 11, at 845 (reviewing research).
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informal marriage.75 In a few countries, it appears that a nontrivial percentage of
cohabitants do choose long-term cohabitation as a marriage substitute.76
2. When Should the State Treat Married and Unmarried Couples Differently?
If cohabitation means many things and rarely means marriage, legislators
should not simply assimilate cohabitation to marriage. There will sometimes be
instances in which it is appropriate to classify unmarried and married couples in
the same way, but each statutory regime must be considered separately, in terms of
its individual purposes.
a. Some Easy Examples: Domestic Violence, Inheritance, and Divorce
Entitlements
Consider laws dealing with domestic violence. The Canadian Law Reform
Commission urges that a domestic violence law limited to married couples "would
lack coherence since exploitation of vulnerable people in relationships does not
occur exclusively, in marriages. 77 The Law Reform Commission is surely right:
domestic violence is actually far more common among cohabitants than married
couples.78 Given that domestic violence laws aim to protect the vulnerable, they
should apply to all forms of relational violence, marital and nonmarital. It would
be illogical, indeed discriminatory, to provide remedies to one group that are
unavailable to the other.
Now consider intestacy laws, which invariably grant a large share, or even all,
of an intestate decedent's estate to his or her surviving spouse. The reason these
laws grant surviving spouses a large share of the decedent's assets is because
75 See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 62, at 1216-18; Kathleen Kiernan, The Rise of
Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 15 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 1
(2001); see also Anne Barlow & Grace James, Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21' Century
Britain, 67 MOD. L. REV. 143, 157-61 (2004) (quoting British cohabitants describing the range of
reasons for cohabitation).
76 For example, in France, half of children living with cohabiting parents do so for at least 9.43
years and only 23.8% of cohabiting relationships involving children terminate in marriage.
Demographers Parick Heuveline & Jeffrey Timberlake conclude that a "substantial minority of
French parents thus seem to choose long-term cohabitation as an alternative to marriage." They also
conclude that, in most surveyed nations, cohabitation typically represents a prelude to or stage in the
marriage process instead of an alternative to marriage. See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 62,
at 1225-26, tbl.3.
77 BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 9, ch. 2, at Coherence.
78 See, e.g., WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 3, at 155 (noting that in a national survey,
cohabiting respondents were more than three times as likely as married respondents to say that
arguments involved hitting, shoving, or throwing things); Sonia Miner Salari & Bret M. Baldwin,
Verbal, Physical, and Injurious Aggression Among Intimate Couples Over Time, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES
523, 535-36 tbl. 1 (2002) (finding that 24% of cohabiting and 7.3% of married couples reported one
of two most serious forms of physical aggression); Todd K. Shackelford, Cohabitation, Marriage and
Murder, 27 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 284, 284 (2001) (reporting Canadian & U.S. studies showing that
women in cohabiting relationships are about nine times more likely than married women to be killed
by a partner).
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inheritance laws function as default distribution schemes for individuals who fail
to execute wills directing distribution of their estates. Legislatures thus design
these schemes to express the distributional preferences of typical decedents,7 9 and
changes in intestacy law tend to follow survey evidence on those preferences.
Contemporary survey evidence shows that spouses overwhelming want to leave
all, or the lion's share, of their estates to the surviving husband or wife;80 only if
the evidence demonstrated that cohabitants have the same feelings about their
partners would we want to rewrite intestacy law, which aim at expressing typical
distributional preferences.
We lack a definitive survey of cohabitants' views, but the short-lived and
uncommitted character of cohabiting relationships suggests that the typical
cohabitant would not want a share of his estate to go automatically to the
individual he "wasn't ready... to get... that close to.. ,,81 Although some
cohabitants undoubtedly do want to leave a portion of their assets to a surviving
partner, the law already protects these individuals by offering them the option of
executing a will. Thus, as current intestacy law likely captures the preferences of
most married and cohabiting couples and provides an easy method for
individualized "fixing" of classificatory mistakes, there is no reason for
abandoning- it.
Essentially the same analysis is applicable to marriage and divorce law
entitlements. Marital obligation has traditionally been thought to derive from the
voluntary assumption of marital roles, rights, and obligations. Divorce law protects
spouses when they rely on the marital commitment and make investments in the
relationship.82 Exploratory relationships in which both partners feel that "they can
just leave ' 83 whenever they choose to do so thus do not create the same contractual
or equitable interests as public, legally binding marital vows. Moreover, in most
jurisdictions, cohabitants are also free to contract with respect to their rights and
obligations. And those cohabitants who wish to obtain the rights and entitlements
of married couples can do so simply by getting married. Like intestacy law, current
marriage and divorce law appears to express the expectations and preferences of
most married and cohabiting couples; it also provides easy methods by which
individual couples can correct classificatory mistakes.
b. Harder Cases: Taxation and Public Benefits
The use of marital status as a determinant of tax burdens and public benefits
poses far more complex regulatory problems. These problems are both equitable
and practical: if cohabitation has many meanings, it is difficult to devise
79 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 75 (6th ed.
2000).
80 See id. at 74-75 (describing survey evidence and its impact on law reform).
81 Manning & Smock, supra note 69, at 999.
82 1 have dealt with divorce entitlements in considerably more detail in Garrison, supra note 11.
83 See Garrison, supra note 11, at 822-26, 829-36 (analyzing sources of marital obligation and
critiquing arguments in favor of extending marital obligation to unmarried cohabitants).
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classificatory schemes that correctly classify the full range of cohabitational
relationships. Given the increased social acceptability of cohabitation, couples may
also cohabit instead of marrying as a means of evading tax burdens and gaining
public benefits.
In looking at the problems raised by marital-status classifications, it is
important to keep in mind that these schemes do not usually aim to either privilege
or penalize marital relationships. Instead, marital-status classifications typically
derive from the assumption that a married couple represents an economic unit in
which the income of one spouse is fully available to the other. This assumption
flows from legal and social norms: marriage partners have .legal support
obligations to each other; 84 both the marriage ceremony and widely accepted
notions of spousal unity tend to foster a marital income-pooling ethic. 85 Thus, even
those spouses who view some assets-inheritances, for example, or premarital
savings-as 'mine" instead of "ours," rarely divide the monthly bills and split
them as roommates would. Instead, they pool earnings to provide for their
combined living expenses or pay expenses based on income.86 Government
officials thus tend to assume that married couples enjoy mutual access to benefits
based on their combined incomes, and the evidence suggests that this is not an
unreasonable assumption.
Mutual access, to shared goods, like the family home, also produces
significant economic benefits; indeed, the U.S. government calculates that the
income necessary to get above the poverty line is about fifty percent less for a two-
person family than for two single-person households. 87 Because a married-couple
household requires less income to maintain the same living standard as two single-
person households, there is considerable logic-and equity-in benefit and tax
rates that treat two married individuals differently than two single individuals with
the same combined incomes.88
84 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 250-58
(2d ed. 1987).
85 For analyses of social norms impact on marriage behavior see Eric A. Posner, Family Law
and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256, 259-62 (F.H. Buckley ed.
1999); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1901
(2000); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225,
1288-92 (1998).
86 See Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabiting and Married Couples'
Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 525,
533 tbl.2 (2003) (finding that 17% of U.S. married and 46% of U.S. cohabiting couples report
keeping their money separate); R.S. Oropesa et al., Income Allocation in Marital and Cohabiting
Unions: The Case of Mainland Puerto Ricans, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 910, 919 (2003) (finding that
married Puerto Rican men pooled income more often than cohabiting men); Anne E. Winkler,
Economic Decision-Making by Cohabitors: Findings Regarding Income Pooling, 29 APp. ECON.
1079, 1079 (1997) (finding that most cohabitants, particularly those without children and in short-
term relationships, do not pool their incomes).
87 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 21, at 453, tbl.685.
88 See Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 897-98(Ct. Cl. 1978) (holding that legislature has
at least a national basis for treating dual income married couples differently from unmarried
individuals with similar income); see also Druker v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1982)
(affirming the holding of Mapes).
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Of course, expense sharing-which appears to be the typical pattern among
cohabitants-also provides living-standard benefits. Although expense sharing
cannot produce the same level of living-standard benefit as income pooling, except
when incomes are equal and all expenses are shared, the benefits of expense-
sharing are nonetheless real and substantial; that is why young adults who are
starting out often seek roommates. Tax and public-benefit authorities rarely bother
With the advantages derived from ekpense sharing on the view that these
advantages derive from income-management strategy, like the decision to save
instead of buy or to buy a less expensive brand instead of a more expensive one,
and not income. The impact of such strategies is variable and hard to measure; it
also seems unfair to tax such socially desirable behavior. 89 But the advantages can
be substantial and, in some situations, they will approach those achieved through
income pooling.
Cohabitation complicates the equities involved in distinguishing income-
pooling from income-management in two ways. First, some cohabitants,
particularly those who have entered into informal marriages, do pool their
incomes. 90 In these cases, lumping the cohabitants in with the roommates instead
of formally married couples is inaccurate and potentially unfair. The evidence just
reviewed suggests that this is not a major problem in the United States, as
cohabitation is typically brief and does not usually induce income pooling. 91
Classificatory schemes that distinguish between cohabitants and married couples
thus are not markedly over- or under-inclusive in relation to the goal of equitable
tax and benefit determination. Moreover, cohabiting couples who want to obtain
tax and other benefits that would be available to a married couple are free to marry
and do so.
Second-and more importantly-treating cohabitants like roommates instead
of married couples provides opportunities to evade tax and public-benefit
eligibility requirements. Imagine Ann and Bill, equal earners about to marry, who
discover that one of them will lose a government pension benefit once they say "I
do." When cohabitation was socially unacceptable in polite society, Ann and Bill
might have sighed over this income loss, but would not likely have changed their
marriage plans.92 Today, however, Ann and Bill are probably living together
already; they also know that they can continue to do so without stigma or even a
raised eyebrow. To the extent that money influences decisions-and both
economists and common sense tell us that it often does-some couples like Ann
and Bill will elect not to marry in order to preserve dollars that they would lose to
government authorities through marriage.
89 Cf Kurt J. Bauman, Shifting Family Definitions: The Effect of Cohabitation and Other
Nonfamily Household Relationships on Measures of Poverty, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 315, 322 (1999)
(reporting that income of a cohabitant was significantly less likely to alleviate material hardship than
income of a spouse).
90 See sources cited supra note 86.
91 See sources cited supra notes 59-62 and 86.
92 See, e.g., Tom Philpott, US. Not Liable For $43,000 Overpayment to Ex-Wife; Disability
Pay Begins, Apr. 6, 2000, http://www.fra.org/mil-up/milup-archive/04-06-00-milup.html (describing
case in which military spouse hid remarriage to continue receiving benefits).
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The demographic data suggest that the number of U.S. rule-evaders is still
small: as we saw earlier, ninety percent of U.S. cohabiting unions terminate in
marriage or separation within five years. 93 But the possibility of tax and eligibility-
criteria evasion through nonmarriage contributes to the perception that the rules are
unfair, and perceived unfairness tends to weaken compliance with legal norms.
94
Over time, evasive behavior could also accelerate and contribute to the decline of
formal marriage.
This analysis suggests that policy makers are caught on the horns of a
dilemma. Because cohabitation typically does not produce the same income-
pooling benefits as marriage, a policy based on the assumption of income-pooling
by cohabitants is counterfactual and might produce serious inequity; the range of
cohabitational relationships and lack of any clear status-change indicators also
pose difficult rule-making and enforcement problems. But because cohabitation
may substitute for formal marriage as a means of obtaining tax and eligibility
benefits, policies that distinguish cohabitation from marriage invite evasion and
contribute to the decline of formal marriage if those policies attach significant
financial benefits to nonmarriage.
Complicating matters further, policies that discourage marriage in some cases
may encourage it in others. For example, until recently, the U.S. tax system
strongly discouraged marriage when a couple earned relatively similar incomes.
But when the couple had dissimilar incomes, the system provided married couples
with a tax advantage and thus had an encouraging effect.95
How should policy makers respond to these difficulties? Does marriage
provide enough public benefits to justify an across-the-board elimination of
marriage "penalties"? To justify targeted penalty-elimination initiatives? Before
we could confidently answer these questions, we would want to know, for each tax
and benefit program, both the likelihood and direct costs of rule-evasion through
non-marriage as well as the direct costs of rules that counter the evasion risk. We
would also want to know the indirect costs-in individual happiness and welfare,
equity, and weakened marital norms-of each approach.
In thinking about the costs and benefits of any classification that promotes or
penalizes marriage, legislators should undertake a similar calculus. They should
consider the direct costs of statutory evasion and of strategies to eliminate it. They
should also consider the larger social costs of public policies that encourage and
discourage marriage: If marriage provides important public benefits, they should
be reluctant to discourage the married state. If marriage provides no benefits or-
worse-creates detriments, they should not.
93 See sources cited supra note 60.
94 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990) (concluding, based on extensive
empirical research, that "people... evaluate laws and the decisions of legal authorities in normative
terms, obeying the law if it is legitimate and moral and accepting decisions if they are fairly arrived
at"); Tom Tyler & Robyn M. Dawes, Fairness in Groups, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE 87, 89-90 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Barron eds., 1993) (summarizing research).
95 Recent changes in tax rates have virtually eliminated the income-tax marriage penalty except
for high-income couples. See Dustin Stamper, Bush Signs Tax Break Extension Bill, 105 TAx. NOTES
146, 146 (2004).
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B. Does Marriage Confer Public Benefits?
1. The Debate Among Family Law Experts
Does marriage provide public benefits? In the legal scholarship, no consensus
has developed. Some family law experts have urged that marriage offers
psychological and ontological benefits derived from its capacity to induce a state
of "belonging" that buffers the anomie of postmodem life.96 Others have urged that
because marriage "implies a reasonably well-understood set of commitments," it
serves as an efficient method of "signaling" intentions, both to one's spouse and
the community.97 Yet, others have argued that because marriage is a formal union
buttressed by law and social norms, it offers the most reliable means of "ensuring
financial security for dependent family members. 98
Legal scholars do not all agree that marriage provides public benefits,
however. Martha Fineman, for example, argues that the "metanarrative of romantic
sexual affiliation has deflected or absorbed concem for nonhorizontal intimate
connections, particularly the one between parent and child;" she contends that the
"the target of state policies should be the caretaker-dependent tie, not that between
sexual affiliates." 99 Other marriage critics argue that marriage, like race, is
discriminatory in that "marital status functions to elevate some individuals, and
subordinate others, based on their membership in groups that they did not choose
to join."100 Yet others contend that, while "the state has a role in protecting and
promoting.. . relational interests," all intimate adult relationships-sexual and
nonsexual-"create unique vulnerabilities" that require "protect[ion] wherever and
with whomever they arise;"' 01 they argue that the law should move toward a
"general-purpose civil union aimed explicitly at protecting and supporting intimate
caregiving units of all types.' ' 10 2 Some critics go so far as to argue that "the law's
96 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Postmodern Family Law: Toward a New Model of Status, in
PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 157, 167 (David Popenoe et al.
eds., 1996); Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging,
1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 31-42; see also Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102
MICH L. REv. 129, 200-07 (2003).
97 Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 245, 250 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (arguing that willingness to marry signals the
undertaking of a long-term, exclusive relational commitment); see also Posner, supra note 85, at
259-62.
98 Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for Dependency,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 229; see also Scott, supra note 85, at 1958; Scott & Scott, supra note 85,
at 1288-92.
99 Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, in JUST MARRIAGE, at 46, 49-50 (Joshua Cohen
& Deborah Chasman eds., 2004); see also FINEMAN, supra note 4, at 239-40 (arguing that society
places value on autonomy at the expense of the young, elderly, and infirm).
100 Bernstein, supra note 96, at 134.
101 Brenda Crossman, Beyond Marriage, in JUST MARRIAGE 93, 97-98 (Joshua Cohen &
Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).
102 Tamara Metz, Why We Should Disestablish Marriage, in JUST MARRIAGE, at 99, 104 (Joshua
Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004); see also BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 9, at ch.2,
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[very] recognition of marriage mandates or facilitates behaviors that cause social
losses."
' 103
Much of the legal scholarship is highly conclusory. For example, the
Canadian Law Reform Commission, arguing that the law should move "beyond
conjugality" toward a "comprehensive" approach that incorporates "not just the
situation of spouses and common-law partners, but also the needs of persons in
non-conjugal relationships, including caregiver relationships," offers no evidence
for this grand proposition except the number of disabled Canadians and a statistical
breakdown of their living arrangements. 10 4 Indeed, some of the paeons for and
against marriage offer no evidence whatsoever. 10 5 Because it is not evidence-
based, the scholarship also tends to be highly abstract: marriage proponents posit
emotional and informational gains from marriage, but fail to specify the nature,
size, or quality of these advantages; marriage opponents posit social detriments
from state recognition of marriage, but are equally vague on just how these harms
are produced.
Legal scholars' failure to offer evidence does not mean that it is unavailable.
The decline of marriage and marital childbearing has spurred an intensive social-
science research effort aimed at investigating the very same issues raised by
marriage advocates and critics. This research effort has not resolved all questions
about the benefits and costs of marriage; for example, it cannot yet explain the
decline in marriage across the industrialized world. But it does offer data bearing
on most of the questions raised by marriage's critics and advocates. It is time to
incorporate these data into the debate over marriage classifications and policies.
2. Does the Married State Benefit Those Who Marry?
The research evidence unequivocally shows health and happiness benefits
associated with marriage. Researcher after researcher has reported that marriedindividuals typically live longer and less disabled lives than the unmarried;
husbands and wives get more sleep, eat more regular meals, and visit the doctor
more regularly; they abuse addictive substances and engage in risky behaviors less
frequently. 10 6 On average, married individuals rate their happiness, mental health,
Coherence; Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y & L.
307, 307 (2004).
103 Bernstein, supra note 96, at 141.
104 BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 1.
105 For example, Professor Regan argues that only a "well-defined social institution such as
[formal] marriage can evoke personal identification with the impersonal value of intimate
commitment" and allow "individuals [to] orient themselves within a distinct cultural narrative in
which self-realization is linked with intimate attachment." Milton C. Regan, Jr., Between Justice and
Commitment, in JUST MARRIAGE 67, 72 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004). The
American Law Institute instead urges that the end of cohabitation "poses the same social and legal
issues as does the dissolution of a marriage." ALL PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, at 6.01 comment A
(discussing scope of legal obligations of domestic partners). Neither offers any evidence in support of
their claims.
106 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 3, at 47-64 (summarizing research); Ross
Stolzenberg & Linda J. Waite, Effects of Marriage, Divorce, and Widowhood on Health, in WORK,
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and sexual experience more highly than unmarried individuals. 10 7 They experience
less domestic violence and greater physical security. 0 8 Although an unfortunately
large proportion of the marriage research comes from the United States, cross-
national surveys show that marriage is associated with higher levels of subjective
well-being across the industrialized and even non-industrialized world.109
Married individuals also do better economically than their unmarried
counterparts. Even after controlling for age, married men earn more than either
FAMILY, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING 361, 363-64, 367-70 (Suzanne Bianchi et al. eds., 2005) (same);
Amy Mehraban Pienta et al., Health Consequences of Marriage for the Retirement Years, 21 J. FAM.
ISSUES 559, 570 (2000). However, the evidence is conflicting on whether the married rate their health
more highly than the unmarried. See Linda J. Waite, Trends in Men's and Women's Well-Being in
Marriage, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION at 368, 375-79
(Linda J. Waite ed., 2000); Zheng Wu et al., "In Sickness and in Health ": Does Cohabitation
Count?, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 811, 811-12 (2003).
107 Russell P.D. Burton, Global Integrative Meaning as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship
Between Social Roles and Psychological Distress, 39 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 201, 201 (1998);
Kathleen A. Lamb et al., Union Formation and Depression: Selection and Relationship Effects, 65 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 953, 960-61 (2003); Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and
Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 53, 68-69 tbl.1.4 (1995). But see Ross Stolzenberg &
Linda J. Waite, How Do Family and Work Affect Health and Well-Being?: Marriage, Divorce, and
Paid Employment, in WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING 368, 374-75 tbl.19.2 (Suzanne
Bianchi, Lynne M. Casper, & Rosalind B, King, eds., 2005); Susan L. Brown et al., The Significance
of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Marital Status and Mental Health Benefits among Middle-Aged and
Older Adults, 60 B. J. GERONTOLOGY S21 (2005) (finding that male, but not female, cohabitants
reported significantly higher depression scores than married men and women after controlling for
sociodemographic variables); Susan L. Brown, Moving from Cohabitation to Marriage: Effects on
Relationship Quality, 33 J. Soc. SCl. RES. 1 (2004); Kaisla Joutsenniemi et al., Living Arrangements
and Mental Health in Finland, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 468,468 (2006) (finding
that adults living alone or with a non-partner were twice as likely as cohabitants and married
individuals to have depressive or anxiety disorder; cohabitants and married individuals did not
differ).
108 See sources cited supra note 78; Waite, supra note 106, at 381-82 tbl.19.6 (finding that
cohabitants with no plans to marry are "substantially and significantly" more likely than married or
engaged couples to report violence).
109 See Ed Diener et al., Similarity of the Relations Between Marital Status and Subjective Well-
Being Across Cultures, 31 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 419, 419 (2000) (finding, based on a 42-
nation survey, that the positive relationship between marital status and subjective well-being did not
differ by gender and was "very similar" across the world); Steven Stack & J. Ross Eshleman, Marital
Status and Happiness; A 17-Nation Study, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527, 534 (1998) (finding that
"married persons have a significantly higher level of happiness than persons who are not
married.., independent of.. control variables including ones for sociodemographic conditions and
national character."). Although cohabitants had a higher level of happiness than single persons, their
happiness level was still "less than one quarter of [that] of married persons." Id. at 53 1; see also Ping.
Qin et al., Suicide Risk in Relation to Socioeconomic, Demographic, Psychiatric, and Familial
Factors: A National Register-Based Study of All Suicides in Denmark, 1981-1997, 160 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 765, 767 (2003) (reporting significantly higher risk of suicide among single and
cohabiting Danes, despite widespread acceptance of cohabitation in Denmark). But see Anke C.
Zimmermann & Richard A. Easterlin, Happily Ever After? Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and
Happiness in Germany, 32 Pop. & DEV. REV. 511, 520 (2006) (finding that life satisfaction of
individuals in intact marriages remained significantly higher than it was before marriage, but that life
satisfaction two or more years after marriage and life satisfaction in cohabiting unions prior to
marriage was not significantly different).
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single men or cohabitants, 110 and they are less likely to lose their earnings through
gambling.'' Married couples also have a higher savings rate and thus accrue
greater wealth than the unmarried.
21 2
However, despite the consistent association between marriage and health,
wealth, and happiness, the research also shows that these benefits are concentrated
in certain types of marriages. First, remarriage appears to confer much smaller
benefits than first marriage. 1 3 Indeed, sociologist Steven Nock found that, while
first marriage was associated with significant gains in men's annual income, weeks
worked, and occupational prestige, remarriage was actually correlated with
negative economic consequences: men who remarried worked less, earned less,
and had less prestigious occupations than they did before their remarriages. 1
4
Second, the various health and well-being benefits associated with marriage
are not uniformly experienced even across first marriages. Violent marriages are
obviously dangerous marriages, and even verbal marital conflict appears to be
unhealthy, particularly for women. 15 Researchers have thus consistently charted
110 "[T]he general consensus in the literature is that controlling for other observable
characteristics, married men are simply more productive than unmarried men." Jeffrey S. Gray &
Michel J. Vanderhart, On the Determination of Wages: Does Marriage Matter?, in THE TIES THAT
BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION, at 356 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000). Married
men also tend to work longer hours and to choose higher-paying jobs and professions. See WAITE &
GALLAGHER, supra note 3, at 99-105; cf Valerie K. Oppenheimer, Cohabiting and Marriage During
Young Men's Career-Development Process, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 127, 127 (2003) (noting that
cohabitation is an adaptive strategy for men during a period of career immaturity). The male
"marriage premium" has declined, however, for reasons that are poorly understood. See Philip N.
Cohen, Cohabitation and the Declining Marriage Premium for Men, 29 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 346,
358-59 (2002).
111 See JW. Welte et al., Gambling Participation and Pathology in the United States-A
Sociodemographic Analysis Using Classification Trees, 29 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 983, 986 (2004)
(finding that the most frequent gamblers were divorced, widowed, or cohabiting men).
112 See Joseph Lupton & James P. Smith, Marriage, Assets, and Savings, in MARRIAGE AND THE
ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 129, 134-36 (Shoshana
Grossbard-Schechtman ed., 2003); Janet Wilmoth, Does Marital History Matter? Marital Status and
Wealth Outcomes Among Preretirement Adults, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 254, 261 (2002); Jay L.
Zagorsky, Marriage and Divorce's Impact on Wealth, 41 J. Soc. 406, 409 (2005).
113 See Kristi Williams & Debra Umberson, Marital Status Stability, Marital Transitions, and
Health: A Life Course Perspective, J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 17-18 (2000), available at http://www.
src.uchicago.edu/prc/pdfs/willia0l.pdf (finding that remarriage in mid-life or .later was associated
with adverse health effects); cf Patricia M. Eng et al., Effects of Marital Transitions on Changes in
Dietary and Other Health Behaviours in US. Male Health Professionals, 59 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY &
COMMUNITY HEALTH 56, 60 (2005) (finding that relative to men who stayed married over four years,
divorce and the death of a spouse were associated with less healthful behavior and that remarriage
was associated with dietary improvement, but less exercise).
114 See STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES 66-68 (1998).
115 See Kristina Orth-Gomer et al., Marital Stress Worsens Prognosis in Women With Coronary
Heart Disease, 284 JAMA 3008 (2000) (finding that among married and cohabiting women,
relationship stress was associated with a 2.9-fold increased risk of recurrent coronary events after
adjustment for confounding variables, and that work stress did not significantly predict recurrent
coronary events).
[Vol. 10
REVIVING MARRIAGE
negative health effects associated with marital discord and stress. 116 Accordingly,
the health and well-being benefits associated with marriage make a case only for
low-conflict marriage.
Third, some of the psychological and health benefits associated with the
married state may well result from the retreat from marriage described in Part Two.
Divorce removes conflicted marriages from the marital pool. The decline of "shot-
gun" marriages entered to avoid an illegitimate birth also appears to have reduced
the pool of unstable, unhappy relationships,'"7 and the rise of cohabitation may
have further reduced the number of conflicted marriages by eliminating them
before marriage takes place. The psychic benefits associated with marriage thus
might decline were vigorous marriage-promotion policies to succeed in attracting
significant numbers of these high-conflict couples back into the marital fold.
Finally, some of the benefits associated with marriage derive from "selection"
effects. To the extent that those who marry are wealthier-or happier, or
healthier-before marriage, they should maintain these advantages after
marriage."i 8 The jury is still out on the extent to which the marriage "premium"
derives from preexisting characteristics or the married state. But economic theory
predicts, and empirical research has confirmed, a higher marriage rate among
employed, high-income men.1 19 Preexisting characteristics thus explain away some
significant part of the marital advantage.
Selection effects do not account for all of the benefits associated with
marriage, however. Researchers who have controlled for obvious confounding
116 See J.K. Kiecolt-Glaser & T.L. Newton, Marriage and Health: His and Hers, 127 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 472, 491-93 (2001) (finding that unhappy marriages have negative .physical-health
consequences); Debra Umberson et al., You Make Me Sick: Marital Quality and Health Over the Life
Course 21-22 (U. Tex. at Austin Population Research Ctr., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 03-04-
05, 2005), available at http://www.prc.utexas.edu/working-papers/wp-pdf/03-0405.pdf (reviewing
evidence); see also Catherine E. Ross et al., Reconceptualizing Marital Status as a Continuum of
Social Attachment, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 129, 139 (1995) (finding that individuals with unhappy
relationships have higher distress levels than people without partners).
"7 See FRANK FURSTENBERG, JR. ET AL., ADOLESCENT MOTHERS IN LATER LIFE 30-33 (1987)
(reporting that marriages contracted during the 1960s to legitimate a child were highly likely to end
in divorce).
118 See Donna K. Ginther & Madeline Zavodny, Is the Male Marriage Premium Due to
Selection? The Effect of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage, 14 J. POPULATION ECON. 313,
313 (2001) (reporting that "at most 10% of the estimated marriage premium [in men's wages] is due
to selection"); Hyoun K. Kim & Patrick C. McHenry, The Relationship Between Marriage and
Psychological Well-Being-A Longitudinal Analysis, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 885, 885 (2002) (finding that
the data "confirmed the strong effects of marital status on psychological well-being," indicated that
"the transition to cohabiting did not have the same beneficial effects as marriage for psychological
well-being," and produced "weak and inconsistent" evidence of selection effects); see, e.g., Pamela J.
Smock et al., The Effect of Marriage and Divorce on Women's Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. Soc.
REv. 794, 809 (1999) (reporting that "the economic benefits of marriage are large, even above and
beyond the characteristics of those who marry").
119 See SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, ON THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE: A THEORY OF
MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND DIVORCE 66-67 (1993) (summarizing studies); Ellwood & Jencks, supra
note 34, at 44-46 (summarizing studies); Pamela J. Smock et al., "Everything's There Except
Money": How Money Shapes Decisions to Marry Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680,
682-83 tbl. 1 (2005) (listing studies).
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factors like age and education continue to report marital advantages. 120
Longitudinal studies have also demonstrated marital impacts. These studies show
that those who were happy when married are less happy when divorced. 12' And at
least for men, marriage brings a "sharp reduction in social evenings at bars or
taverns," and "an enormous increase" in involvement with relatives and church-
related activities. 122 Married men give more time to relatives and less to friends
and acquaintances.123 At least their first marriages are associated with measurable
positive changes in annual income, weeks worked, and occupational prestige.1
24
Their loss of a spouse is associated with less healthy behaviors. 125 Researchers thus
almost universally agree that some, as yet undetermined, fraction of the marital
advantage is real, although they also agree that it is concentrated in stable, low-
conflict relationships.
Why would marriage produce health, wealth, and happiness benefits?
Obviously, marriage provides companionship and social support, factors that
themselves are consistently associated with health and happiness. 26 However,
cohabitation also provides companionship and social support. The consistent
advantages associated with marriage provide evidence for the claim that marriage
is a more felicitous state than cohabitation, but they do not clearly show the
mechanisms by which these benefits are produced. Some sociologists, like the
legal scholars who favor marriage, posit benefits flowing from public commitment
and the behavioral expectations induced by legal and social norms; 127 some also
120 See generally Nadine F. Marks, Flying Solo at Mid-Life: Gender, Marital Status, and
Psychological Well-Being 10-11 (Univ. of Wis. Ctr. for Demography & Ecology, Working Paper No.
95-03), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/cdewp/95-03.pdf (reviewing research on selection
effects' impact on happiness levels).
121 See Nadine F. Marks & James D. Lambert, Marital Status Continuity and Change Among
Young and Midlife Adults: Longitudinal Effects on Psychological Well-Being, 19 J. FAM. ISSUES 652,
659-60 (1998); cf Allan V. Horowitz et al., Becoming Married and Mental Health: A Longitudinal
Study of a Cohort of Young Adults, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 652, 896 (1998).
NOCK, supra note 114, at 94-95.
123 Id. at 120. Fulfillment of these behavioral expectations appears to be associated with marital
stability. See Kristen R. Heimdal, Cohabiting and Married Couples' Income Organization:
Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 528 (2003) (reporting that
both Swedish and U.S. married couples who had been divorced were more likely to keep their money
separate).
124 See NOCK, supra note 114, at 82 (summarizing findings); see also Jeffrey S. Gray, On the
Determination of Wages: -Does Marriage Matter?, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON
MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 356, 363 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000) (finding that men's marital wage
premium was significantly and negatively correlated with wife's employment and later divorce). But
see Audrey Light, Gender Differences in the Marriage and Cohabitation Income Premium, 41
DEMOGRAPHY 263 (2004) (finding that men's needs-adjusted income levels remained unchanged both
when they cohabited and when they married).
125 See sources cited supra note 121.
126 See Farouk Mookadam & Heather M. Arthur, Social Support and Its Relationship to
Morbidity and Mortality After Acute Myocardial Infarction, 164 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1514 (2004)
(finding that low social support was significant risk factor for morbidity and mortality one year after
heart attack); Sheldon Cohen et al., Social Ties and Susceptibility to the Common Cold, 277 JAMA
1940, 1940 (1997) (finding link between incidence of the common cold and level of social support).
127 See NOCK, supra note 114, at 11-42; Cherlin, supra note 49, at 136-37.
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theorize that marriage signifies "that the partners have successfully fulfilled their
adult social roles."' 128 These theories of how the marital advantage develops are
difficult to empirically prove, and demographer Kathleen Kiernan has alternatively
suggested that the marital advantage may instead derive from "stronger and more
committed partnerships being selected into marriage."'129 Kiernan argues that the
stability and other advantages associated with marriage will simply disappear if
cohabiting couples increasingly eschew marriage. 130 On this view, cohabitation
would absorb the marital success stories and thereafter become a more successful
relationship model itself.
The fact that remarriage is not associated with the same benefits as first
marriage provides some support for Kiernan's theory. Were the benefits of
marriage derived primarily from public commitments and behavioral expectations,
we would anticipate that remarriage-which entails the same commitments and
expectations-would produce equivalent advantages. It is possible, of course, that
a prior marital failure may inhibit commitment and sharing expectations; there is
evidence to support this supposition, too.13' The bottom line is that we simply do
not know how the marital advantage is produced. We thus cannot say whether
Kiernan is right or wrong in asserting that the benefits associated with marriage are
simply artifacts, and not the product of commitment, social norms, or other aspects
of marital status.
Assuming that commitment and social norms do play a significant role in
producing the marital advantage, is it also far from obvious that law is needed to
preserve these benefits. No social scientist has compared formal and informal
marriage; we thus cannot say whether the psychic and economic benefits
associated with marriage would be lost or significantly diminished if marriage
were to become a private status unregulated by the state. It is logical to suppose
that entry into a public legal status that confers binding obligations and mandates
formal exit procedures represents a different, more carefully considered, and more
secure experience than entry into an informal relationship; certainly, any number
of theorists has supposed-across a broad range of legal categories-that this is
so. 1 32 But we lack the data to prove that formal marital obligations alter individual
experience, and many logical suppositions about the sources of greater health and
happiness ultimately prove to be unfounded.
33
128 Cherlin, supra note 49, at 137; see also NOCK, supra note 114, at 26-27.
129 Kiernan, supra note 28, at 91.
130 id.
13 1 For example, remarried couples are less likely to pool their resources. See sources cited
supra note 86.
132 See generally Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996)
(arguing that the justification for centralized law should begin with the identification of a failure in
the structure of social norms); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577
(2000) (discussing social norms that regulate civil acts).
133 See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Big Study Finds No Clear Benefit of Calcium Pills, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
16, 2006, at Al; Gina Kolata, Low-Fat Diet Does Not Cut Health Risks, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 8, 2006, at
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On balance, then, the social science evidence supports the claim that marriage
provides individual benefits that, in the aggregate, enhance the public good. But
the evidence does not offer a strong case for the promotion of marriage per se:
marriage can be harmful as well as helpful; remarriage does not appear to confer
the same benefits as first marriage; and some obvious marriage promotion
strategies-for example, marriage incentives that produce more "shotgun"
marriages-could easily increase the number of weak marriages and thus work
more harm than good. Perhaps most importantly, because we do not know exactly
how the advantages associated with marriage are produced, we do not know
whether, or to what extent, legal support for formal marriage is necessary to
preserve them.
3. Does Marriage Benefit Children?
Although the adult benefits associated with marriage seem to support marital
conflict-reduction more than they do marriage promotion, the social science
evidence shows that marriage benefits children, too. Children born to married
parents experience much greater stability than children born to unmarried parents;
indeed, cross-national research shows that, in most countries, children born to
cohabiting parents are two to four times more likely to see their parents separate
than are children of parents married at the time of birth. 134 Because of the greater
stability that marriage provides, marital children are exposed to many fewer
financial,1 35 physical, 136 and educational risks. 137 Unsurprisingly, lower risks
134 See Patrick Heuveline et al., Shifting Childrearing to Single Mothers: Results from 17
Western Countries, 29 Pop. & DEV. REV. 47, 56-57 (2003); see also Gunnar Andersson, Children's
Experience of Family Disruption and Family Formation: Evidence from 16 FFS Countries, 7
DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 343, 353 tbl.5 (2002) (finding that about 78% of children born to cohabiting and
35% of children born to married parents will spend time in a single-parent family before age fifteen);
Bumpass & Lu, supra note 36, at 38 tbl.6 (finding that children born to married parents spend 84% of
their childhood in two-parent families; children born to cohabiting parents "may spend about a
quarter of their childhood years with a single parent, a quarter with a cohabiting parent, and less than
half with married parents"); Kiernan, supra note 28, at 84 fig.3.6 (showing survey data from ten
countries); Cynthia Osborne et al., Instability in Fragile Families: The Role of Race-Ethnicity,
Economics, and Relationship Quality 9 tbl.2 (Bowling Green St. Univ., Working Paper 2005-02,
2005), available at http://www.bgsu.edu/organizations/cfdr/research/pdf/2005/2005-02.pdf (reporting
that in a nationally representative U.S. sample, 40% of children born to cohabiting parents and 10%
of children born to married parents experienced their parents' separation within three years of birth).
135 See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 31, at 111-12 fig.4.3 (reporting, in 1998, a 6.9% poverty
rate for married-parent households and a 38.7% rate for single-mother households). Noncustodial
divorced and never-married parents are also less likely to pass on wealth to their adult children. See
Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Effect of Divorce on Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence,
32 DEMOGRAPHY 319, 319 (1995); Nadine F. Marks, Midlife Marital Status Differences in Social
Support Relationships with Adult Children and Psychological Well-Being, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 5, 5
(1995).
136 Rates of physical and sexual abuse are much higher when children live with an adult
stepparent or cohabitant. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI's
Treatment of De Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 90, 90 (Robin H. Wilson ed., 2006) (reviewing
evidence).
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produce higher levels of well-being.' 38 There is also evidence that the advantages
conferred by marital childbearing and rearing transcend the specific benefits
associated with residential and economic stability. For example, married fathers
appear to be more involved and spend more time with their children than
unmarried -fathers; if parental separation occurs, they see their children more often
and pay child support more regularly. 
139
The advantages of marriage appear to extend into a child's adulthood, and
even to his or her children. Researchers have documented a strong link between
growing up in a single-parent household and adult income, health, and emotional
stability. 140 A number of studies have also found that both men and women who
experience a single-parent household as children are more likely, as adults, to
experience marital discord and to divorce or separate. 141 Indeed, researchers have
reported that even- grandparental divorce is significantly associated with less
education, more marital discord, more divorce, and greater tension in early parent-
child relationships. 1
42
Marriage is associated with advantages to children at all income and
education levels. The experts have found that,
Even among the poor, material hardships were substantially lower among
married couple families with children than among other families with
children, including those with at least two potential earners.... [A]mong
137 See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS 39-63 (1994) (reviewing evidence); Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan,
Father Absence and Child Well-Being: A Critical Review, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 116, 120-
22 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) (reviewing evidence).
138 See Paul R. Amato & Jacob Cheadle, The Long Reach of Divorce: Divorce and Child Well-
Being Across Three Generations, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 191, 193 (2005); Sigle-Rushton &
McLanahan, supra note 137, at 122-25 (summarizing studies).
139 See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 31, at 46 (reporting that children whose parents never
married see their fathers less frequently after parental separation); Marcy Carlson et al., Unmarried
But Not Absent: Fathers' Involvement With Children After a Nonmarital Birth (Center Res. Child
Wellbeing, Working Paper 2005-07) (finding that parents' relationship status at child's birth is key
predictor of paternal involvement); Lingxin Hao, Family Structure, Private Transfers, and the
Economic Well-Being of Families with Children, 75 Soc. FORCES 269, 279-286 (1996) (finding that
married fathers were more likely to pay child support); Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson,
Are All Dads Equal? Biology Versus Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 213, 223-24 (2003) (finding that unmarried fathers were significantly less involved with their
children than married fathers); see also Susan L. Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The
Significance of Parental Cohabitation, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351 (2004) (reporting that children
living in cohabiting-parent families experienced worse outcomes, on average, than those residing
with married-parent families; among children age 6-11, economic and parental resources attenuated
these differences, but resources did not make a difference among adolescents age 12-17).
140 See Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 137, at 124-26.
141 See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF
FAMILY UPHEAVAL 106-17 (1997) (summarizing studies); Amato & Cheadle, supra note 138, at 192-
93 (same); see also Kiernan, supra note 20, at 55 tbl.3.8; Jay D. Teachman, The Childhood Living
Arrangements of Children.and the Characteristics of Their Marriages, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 86, 86-87
(2004).
142 See Amato & Cheadle, supra note 138, at 195-98.
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families with the same income-to-needs ratios, those in married couple
families experienced significantly less hardship. The marriage impacts
were quite large, generally higher than the effects of education. 143
The marital advantage also appears to hold across national and cultural
boundaries. Even in Scandinavia, which has the longest experience with
cohabitation as a mainstream family form, demographers continue to find that
marital childbearing is associated with much greater childhood stability, 144 smaller
risks to youthful and adult well-being, 145 and lower rates of divorce and nonmarital
childbearing. 146 For example, in Sweden, where state policies "tend to view
cohabitation as equal to marriage, and many of the regulations of marriage are
applied to cohabiting relationships,"'' 47 cohabiting parents are more than four times
as likely as married parents to separate before their first child turns five. 148 And
despite an extraordinarily high level of public assistance to single parents-
assistance that produces a child poverty rate of less than three percent149-single
parenthood remains a serious risk factor for children. The most compelling study,
which analyzed almost a million cases and took account of possibly confounding
factors such as socioeconomic status and parental mental health, found that
143 Robert I. Lerman, Impacts of Marital Status and Parental Presence on the Material Hardship
of Families with Children 20-21, 25 (July 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/marriage-well-
being03/hardship.pdf.
144 See An-Magritt Jensen & Sten-Erik Clausen, Children and Family Dissolution in Norway:
The Impact of Consensual Unions, 10 CHILDHOOD 65, 65 (2003) (finding that children of cohabiting
parents run a much higher risk of dissolution compared to children in marital unions and that "this
risk is not diminishing as cohabitation becomes more widespread"); Kiernan, supra note 28, at 84
fig.3.6 (showing that 6% of Swedish marital unions and 25% of nonmarital unions dissolve within
five years after the birth of a first child).
145 See Kyrre Breivik & Dan Olweus, Children of Divorce in a Scandinavian Welfare State:
Are They Less Affected than U.S. Children?, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 61 passim (2006)
(concluding based on a study of 4,000 twelve to fifteen year old Norweigian children, that the
negative associations between parental divorce and adverse child outcomes were generally very
similar in Norway and the United States in spite of the great differences in family policy and welfare
benefits for single mothers); Helen Hansagi et al., Parental Divorce: Psychosocial Well-Being,
Mental Health and Mortality During Youth and Young Adulthood: A Longitudinal Study of Swedish
Conscripts, 10 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 86, 86 (2000) (reporting that in a group of Swedish conscripts,
several indicators of low levels of well-being and mental illness, including alcoholism, were
significantly correlated with parental divorce even after adjustment for antecedents and other factors);
Jan 0. Jonsson & Michael Gahler, Family Dissolution, Family Reconstitution, and Children's
Educational Careers: Recent Evidence for Sweden, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 277, 287 (1997) (finding that,
even after controlling for all independent variables, children of divorced and separated parents and
children li'ing in reconstituted families have low school-continuation propensities compared to
children living with both biological parents); see also Taru H. Makikyro et al., Hospital-Treated
Psychiatric Disorders in Adults with a Single-Parent and Two-Parent Family Background: A 28-
Year Follow-Up of the 1966 Northern Finland Cohort, 37 FAM. PROCESS 335, 336-37 (1998).
146 See Kathleen Kiernan, Redrawing the Boundaries of Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
980, 983 (2004).
147 Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra note 86, at 527.
148 See Kiernan, supra note 28, at 84 fig.3.6.
149 See A LEAGUE TABLE OF CHILD POVERTY IN RICH NATIONS 4, fig.1 (2000) [hereinafter
UNICEF], available at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/repcard 1 e.pdf.
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Swedish children in single-parent households showed significantly increased risks
of all adverse outcomes analyzed, including "psychiatric disease, suicide or suicide
attempt, injury, and addiction."' 150
However, just as the adult benefits associated with marriage are concentrated
in low-conflict, enduring relationships, so are the advantages of marriage to
children. Although children living in high-conflict marriages may still reap
economic advantages from doing so, researchers have found that the continuation
of a high-conflict marriage is negatively associated with children's health and
happiness, just as it is for adults; indeed, longitudinal surveys show that "parents'
marital unhappiness and discord have a broad negative impact on virtually every
dimension of offspring well-being."' 5'1 Moreover, although "[p]arental divorce also
appears to have negative consequences for offspring, . . . these are not as pervasive
as the effects of parents' marital quality.' ' 152 It thus appears that parental divorce
actually "benefits children in certain ways if it removes them from a discordant
parental household. ... If divorce were limited only to high-conflict marriages,
then divorce would generally be in children's best interest.'
153
Again mirroring the research on adults, remarriage to a stepparent also fails to
confer the same advantages as a continuing marriage between the child's parents.
Children living in step-families tend to score lower than children living in intact
families on tests of emotional and social well-being. Stepparents tend to be less
warm, less involved, and less active in children's lives than are biological parents
in intact, marital households.
154
Not only are the advantages of marital child rearing concentrated in low-
conflict, enduring relationships, but-once again mirroring the research on adult
marriage partners-selection effects explain away a large portion of the marital
advantage:
Having a child while single is three times as common for the poor as
for the affluent. Half of poor women who give birth while unmarried
150 Gunilla Ringback Weitoft et al., Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in Children Living
with Single Parents in Sweden: A Population-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289, 289 (2003).
151 AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 141, at 219.
152 Id. at 219.
153 Id. at 220. Longitudinal research also shows that many of the psychological symptoms that
follow divorce also predate it. See John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict as a Risk Factor for Child
Maladjustment, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 97, 97-108 (2005) (reviewing studies); Joan B. Kelly, Children's
Adjustment in Conflicted Marriage and Divorce: A Decade Review of Research, 39 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, 963 passim (2000) (reviewing studies).
154 See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 137, at 39-63; Hofferth & Anderson, supra note
139, at 222 (finding that stepfathers spent less time and were less involved with children than married
biological fathers); Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being in Cohabiting,
Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 877-78, 890 (2003) (reporting
that neither cohabitation nor marriage to a nonparent is associated with uniform advantage in
behavior or academic success among'teenagers living in single-mother families); Susan D. Stewart,
How the Birth of a Child Affects Involvement with Stepchildren, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 461, 462
(2005) (summarizing research). Living with an unrelated adult may also pose risks to children. See
Wilson, supra note 136, at 92.
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have no high school diploma at the time, and nearly a third have not
worked at all in the last year .... And the situations of the men that
father their children are not much better. More than four in ten poor men
who have a child outside of marriage have already been to prison or jail
by the time the baby is born; nearly half lack a high school diploma, and
a quarter have no job.... [A]lmost half of them earned less than $10,000
in the year before the birth.155
These patterns may be less pronounced in Western Europe, 156 but in the
United States some commentators have urged that reproductive behavior now
diverges along class lines: educated young adults with good prospects continue to
link childbearing with marriage, while the poor, ill-educated, and troubled do not.
And even within Western Europe the available data suggests that "unmarried
parenthood may be more closely associated with impoverishment than
empowerment." 57
Unmarried parents also tend to report many more relational stresses than their
married counterparts. Parents who are unmarried when their child is born are more
likely than married parents to have children by another partner. 58 Their children
are much more likely to be unplanned.15 9 They report higher levels of conflict and
155 EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 51, at 2; see also GREGORY Acs & SANDY NELSON, URBAN
INST., SHOULD WE GET MARRIED IN THE MORNING? A PROFILE OF COHABITING COUPLES WITH
CHILDREN 12, tbl.2 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310962_DP04-0l.pdf
(finding that cohabiting unmarried parents were significantly less likely to work, to be high school
dropouts, and to be under age 25 than married parents); Lerman, supra note 143, at 12 (finding that
70% of married, two-parent families, 54% of cohabiting two-parent families, and 48% of single-
parent families had an adult with more education than a high school diploma); Wendy D. Manning &
Daniel T. Lichter, Parental Cohabitation and Children 's Economic Well Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 998, 1000 (1996) (finding that unmarried fathers earned about half of what married fathers
earned in 1990); Musick, supra note 37, at 915 (reporting that level of education and socioeconomic
status are significant predictors of nonmarital birth); Osborne et al., supra note 134, at 7 (finding that,
in a nationally representative sample, married parents reported almost twice the annual income of
cohabitants and that less than 20% of married fathers and almost two-fifths of cohabiting fathers had
less than a high school diploma).
156 In Western Europe, nonmarital birth is not concentrated among the very young, and births
within cohabiting unions are far more common. See Larry L. Wu et al., Historical and Life Course
Trajectories of Nonmarital Childbearing, in OUT OF WEDLOCK: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
NONMARITAL FERTILITY 3-28 (Lawrence L. Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2004); Kiernan, supra note
35, at 77-108.
157 Kiernan, supra note 28, at 90 (reporting that in the U.K. and Sweden "women who become
mothers in a cohabiting union are more likely to have partners who are either unemployed or in partly
skilled .or unskilled occupations" and that French unmarried parents "still tend to be
disproportionately from lower socioeconomic groups").
,58 See McLanahan, supra note 43, at 6.
159 See THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES 31-32 tbl.2.2 (Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995) (concluding that 88% of
never-married, 68.5% of previously-married, and 40% of married women's pregnancies are
unplanned); Wendy D. Manning, Childbearing in Cohabiting Unions: Racial and Ethnic Differences,
33 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 217, 221 tbl.5 (2001) (reporting that 18% of married, 44% of
cohabiting, and 61% of single, noncohabiting women said that their first birth was unintended).
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distrust, more problems with drugs and alcohol, more physical and mental health
problems, 160 and more domestic violence. 161 Indeed, the evidence shows that many
unwed parents fail to marry precisely because their relationships are highly
problematic.1
62
As with adults, the socioeconomic and relational attributes of those who
marry explain many, but not all, of the advantages marriage appears to offer to
children.163 In the United States, the nationally representative Fragile Families
Study has shown that, even after controlling for the "mother's characteristics,
parents' fertility history, the couple's economic characteristics, and relationship
quality,. . . [p]arents who are cohabiting at their child's birth still have over twice
the odds of separation as compared to parents who are married. ,,164 Married
fathers in intact families appear to spend more time with their children; after
separation, they see their children more frequently and pay child support more
160 See Michelle DeKlyen et al., The Mental Health of Parents with Infants: Do Marriage,
Cohabitation and Romantic Status Matter?, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1836, 1837-41 tbls.1 to 3 (2006)
(finding that unmarried parents report higher levels of mental health and behavior problems than
married parents, and unmarried parents whose relationships ended prior to the birth report more
impairment than other groups of unmarried parents).
161 See McLanahan, supra note 43, at 56, 11 & tbl.l(reporting that unmarried fathers were
twice as likely as married ones to have a physical or psychological problem that interfered with their
ability to find or keep a job, and several times more likely to abuse drugs or alcohol; more than 25%
of unmarried and less than 10% of married fathers were un employed when their child was born);
Osborne et al., supra note 134, at 13 (stating that cohabiting mothers reported significantly higher
levels of disagreement with father in month prior to child's birth).
162 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 51, at 81. Edin & Keflas report that about a third of
unmarried mothers interviewed blamed crime for the break-up of their relationship and that:
[m]ore than a third blamed their partner's alcoholism or drug addiction. Four in ten say
their relationship broke down because their child's father couldn't manage to stay
faithful. An even higher proportion-nearly half-say that they could no longer take the
chronic abuse they suffered at his hands. Taken together fully two-thirds of the mothers
say they've had a relationship disintegrate for one or more of these reasons, and about
half have encountered these problems with more than one man.
Id.; see also Maureen R. Waller & Sara McLanahan, "His" and "Her" Marriage Expectations:
Determinants and Conseqrences, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 53, 62-64 (2005) (reporting that, in a
nationally representative sample of unmarried parents, both marriage and staying together during the
first eighteen months after child's birth were significantly associated with father's education,
mother's age, and couple's joint expectations about their relatidnship; couples were twice as likely to
stay together and more than seven times more likely to marry if both partners were "optimistic" about
future marriage at the time their child was born, and optimism was strongly related to reported
conflict, gender distrust, and shared'activities).
163 See Acs & NELSON, supra note 155, at 17-19 (reporting that about two-thirds of the marital
advantage in child poverty and half the advantage in parental mental health was due to observable
differences between cohabiting and married individuals); see also ARIEL HALPERN, POVERTY AMONG
CHILDREN BORN OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF
AMERICA'S FAMILIES 7-8, available at http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/Devolution/IJI_Poverty amongch
ildren bomoutside of marriage_00331_02596.pdf (finding that young children born to married
parents were just as likely to live in poverty as nonmarital counterparts).
164 Osborne et al., supra note 134, at 12-13; see also Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note
137, at 126-30 (analyzing selection effects and finding that they "do not account for all the
differences in children, families, and subsequent outcomes").
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regularly than unmarried fathers. 165 There is also evidence that, even after
controlling for observable characteristics like education, academic test scores, and
premarital pregnancy, marriage contributes significantly to living standards, "not
only relative to single parents living alone but also compared to mothers in
cohabiting relationships or single parents living with other adult relatives. 166
We do not know how these benefits associated with marriage are produced.
Nor, given nonmarital parents' typically high levels of conflict and distrust, can we
assume that these benefits could be obtained were such parents to marry. Indeed, it
seems probable that the marriage of high-conflict cohabitants would simply
increase the number of high-conflict marriages-marriages that are not
advantageous to children-and, in many cases, substitute marital for nonmarital
separation.
The likelihood of this result is enhanced by the fact that the very same
characteristics that predict nonmarriage also predict marital instability. Divorce is
more than twice as common among couples living below the poverty line as it is in
the general population, 167 and elevated divorce rates are also significantly
associated with youth, educational disadvantage, unemployment, violence,
conflict, and infidelity.
168
The fact that marriage by itself is incapable of curing, or even dramatically
curbing, the problems associated with nonmarital childbearing does not mean that
marriage is irrelevant to children's well-being. Indeed, the fact that the less
advantaged increasingly choose to bear children outside marriage "may be
differentially harming children from less advantaged backgrounds and reinforcing
inequalities in other domains. 169 But to provide lasting benefits to children, state
policy must succeed not just in encouraging parents to marry, but also to marry
165 See sources supra note 139.
166 Lerman, supra note 143, at 32.
167 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY FORMATION: WHEN
HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE, AND FORM 18-21 (Current Pop. Rpt. Series P-23 No. 180,
1992); see also WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 154-55 (1993)
(summarizing research on relationship between socioeconomic class and divorce rates); Zimmerman
& Easterlin, supra note 109, at 515 (finding that those whose marriages break up have lower average
socioeconomic status).
168 See BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 29, at 18 (reporting 48% ten-year dissolution risk for
U.S. brides under eighteen and 24% risk for brides over twenty-five); E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON &
JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 34-35 (2002) (reporting that one
quarter of the sample of divorced wives cited alcoholism, physical abuse, or extramarital sex and one-
third cited financial problems as factors contributing to the decision to divorce); ROSE M. KREIDER,
NUMBER, TIMING AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2001 8-10 tbls.5-6 (Current Pop.
Rpt. 70-97, 2005) (reporting median age at first divorce of thirty-two in 2001); Raley & Bumpass,
supra note 38, at 205 (reporting that roughly 60% of marriages of women without high school
degrees and 33% of marriages of women with college degrees end in separation or divorce);
Zimmerman & Easterlin, supra note 109, at 518-19 (finding that those who divorce have personality
traits that might adversely affect likelihood of an enduring union).
169 Will Marshall & Isabel V. Sawhill, Progressive Family Policy in the Twenty-First Century,
in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 198, 202 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) (quoting David
Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Growing Difference in Family Structure: What Do We Know?
Where Do We Look for Answers? (2001) (unpublished paper)).
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well and stay married. Because the chances of such a sequence are dramatically
reduced when couples are immature and their relationships troubled by infidelity,
violence, substance abuse, and the stresses associated with poverty, a marriage-
promotion policy could not accomplish much for children unless it focused on the
linked goals of encouraging healthy marriages with good prospects of long-term
success and discouraging childbearing outside of such relationships.
4. Does Marital Formality Provide Public Benefits?
We have seen that stable, low-conflict marriage is associated with significant
benefits to adults and far more dramatic benefits to children. We do not know
whether informal, marriage-like unions are capable of producing the same
advantages. For both adults and their children, it is logical to suppose that a public
commitment that entails binding legal obligations and necessitates formal exit
procedures would be experienced differently than an informal relationship; indeed,
unmarried mothers themselves suggest that the ceremonial aspects of marriage are
important and meaningful to them.170 But long-term, low-conflict cohabitation is
sufficiently rare that we lack the data to establish how it compares with formal
marriage. We thus cannot say for sure that formal registration is an important
source of measurable benefit to either adults or children.
Formal registration does provide significant evidentiary benefits, however,
benefits that are often overlooked in the debate over marriage. Formal marriage not
only signals intention to a partner, friends, and family, it also signals intention to
the state, and it accomplishes both of these signaling functions prospectively,
efficiently, and unequivocally. After a couple marries, there is no question about
what sort of relationship they intend. No litigation will be necessary to determine
their relational status. No decision-maker will be required to sift through heaps of
self-serving testimony about promises made and understandings reached. One
partner cannot surprise the other by bringing a fraudulent claim, nor can one
partner surprise the other by trying to evade a just claim.
Informal marriage lacks all of these merits. It must be proven and thus offers
only a retrospective status. Gaining that status will almost invariably necessitate
costly and time-consuming litigation.
These basic disadvantages are compounded by the evidentiary problems
inherent in fact-based determination of marital status. Marital intent is subjective;
when not publicly expressed, it .is extraordinarily hard to prove. This basic
difficulty is exacerbated by the range of meanings associated with cohabitation'71
and the fact that cohabitants often do not agree about the nature of their
relationship. Researchers have found that, in twenty to forty percent of cohabiting
relationships, partners express different views on whether they plan to marry each
other. 172 Moreover, in one survey, about a third of the time, only one partner felt
170 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 51; at 115-17; Edin et al., supra note 50, at 1009.
171 See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 62, at 1215-18.
172 See Susan L. Brown, Union Transitions Among Cohabiters: The Significance of
Relationship Assessment and Expectations, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 833, 838-89 (2000) (reporting
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that the couple spent a lot of time together, and in forty percent of the cases, one
partner but not the other reported a high degree of happiness with the
relationship. 73
Given the lack of uniformity in cohabitants' understandings and behaviors,
the mere fact of living together provides little evidence of what their relationship
means. One partner might fully believe that the relationship is committed; the other
might fully believe the reverse. A break-up can only enhance such disagreement,
setting the stage for disappointed expectations and resulting litigation. These
difficulties are bad enough when both cohabitants are able to testify at a hearing;
they are even worse when the issue of marital understanding is tested in a
proceeding brought after one partner dies.
These various evidentiary problems have fueled the movement away from the
common law marriage doctrine. At one time, nearly two-thirds of the states
recognized common law marriage; by 2002, only twelve jurisdictions did so,174 and
two of the twelve had adopted strict limitations on its establishment. 175 This
decline reflects the sad fact that post-hoc, litigation-based determination of marital
commitment often "leads to fraud and uncertainty in the most important of human
relationships." 176 The evidentiary problems posed by the common law marriage
doctrine were minimized when nonmarital cohabitation was rare; they are
magnified in an era, like this one, in which cohabitation is extraordinarily common
and extremely variable in its meaning.
In Part A, we saw that informal marriage, in which a couple make private
marital commitments but forgo the marriage vows that publicly signal those
commitments, pose serious classification problems for policymakers attempting to
fashion fair and fraud-resistant rules for determining public benefits and burdens.
Because cohabitation only rarely implies an informal marriage, policy makers
cannot-or should not-assume either marital commitments or the sharing ethic
associated with those commitments from the fact of cohabitation; to do so risks the
imposition of unfair burdens on cohabitants who have consciously elected not to
marry in order to preserve their autonomy and independence. But when there are
burdens associated with marital status, the availability of informal marriage
provides a means of fraudulently avoiding those burdens.
Because of the uncertainty, cost, evidentiary, and rule-evasion problems
inherent in informal marriage, policymakers have reason to encourage formal
about 20%); Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 923 (1991) (same); Sharon Sassler & James McNally, Cohabiting Couple's
Economic Circumstances and Union Transitions: A Re-Examination Using Multiple Imputation
Techniques, 32 Soc. ScI. RES. 553, 568 (2004) (finding 42%).
113 See Brown, supra note 172, at 838.
174 See HARRY E. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 87 (5th ed.
2003).
175 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 2.402 (1997) (requiring affirmation of a common law marriage in
"declaration form"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1953) (requiring establishment of a common
law marriage within one year of its dissolution).
176 CLARK, supra note 84, at 59; see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring
Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709, 732-51 (1996).
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marriage even if informal unions are capable of providing the same emotional and
economic benefits to adults and children. Informal marriage cannot clearly,
efficiently, and prospectively alter a couple's status in accordance with their
intentions; formal marriage can and does. Informal marriage creates undesirable
opportunities for fraud and rule evasion; formal marriage does not.
IV. CAN GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE GOOD MARRIAGES?
A. Aims and Achievement
We have seen that formal marriage provides procedural benefits that derive
from its notarial function: the marriage ceremony provides a clear, certain, and
efficient method of signaling marital intention and effecting a change in relational
status. We have also seen that low-conflict, enduring marriage is associated with
significant health, wealth, and happiness benefits for adult marriage partners and,
to an even greater extent, their children.
These various benefits provide a plausible basis for government efforts to
promote formal marriage. After all, governments routinely promote beneficial
behaviors. In the United States, the federal government regularly exhorts its
citizens to eat their vegetables and to exercise more often and more vigorously. It
warns them against smoking and taxes them if they continue to light up.
There is no constitutional barrier that would preclude similar governmental
efforts to promote the public benefits associated with successful, formal marriages.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already approved statutory schemes, like those
considered in Part Three, that tax or reward marital decisions. 177 These schemes
typically were not designed to either promote or discourage marriage, but
regulatory regimes with that aim certainly could be designed and put in place.
In recent years, marriage advocates have urged a diverse array of marriage-
promotion initiatives. Some focus on divorce reform. Some focus on public
-education. Some aim to increase the marriage rate either through direct incentives
or the elimination of marriage "penalties" like those considered in Part Three.
Some strive for marital-conflict reduction, and some seek to reduce nonmarital
births, particularly among teenage mothers.
The evidence reviewed in Part Three offers one means of evaluating these
varied proposals. This evidence shows that formal marriage offers procedural
advantages over informal marriage in each and every case; it also shows that
marriage-both formal and informal-is associated with significant personal
benefits only in the context of an enduring, low-conflict relationship. These
findings support governmental efforts to channel marital intentions into formal
relationships, but they do not support governmental efforts to promote marriage
177 See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977) (upholding a provision of the Social Security
Act and noting that the Act was "not rendered invalid simply because some persons who might
otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were burdened
thereby"); see also Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 897-98 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (upholding income
tax "marriage penalty"); Druker v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1982) (same).
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per se. Indeed, for high-conflict relationships, the data suggest that government
policy should aim at discouraging marriage and facilitating divorce. Because only
low-conflict, enduring relationships offer significant personal benefits to adult
partners and their children, only initiatives aimed at promoting this narrow
category of marriages are justifiable. Those that aim to promote marriage more
broadly should be resisted.
While the research data enable us to reject those marriage-promotion
strategies that aim at inappropriate goals, they cannot tell us whether an initiative
with the right goals is worth pursuing. Policy-makers must also take account of
practical constraints- cost, efficacy, noncompliance, secondary effects, gaps in
our understanding of the behavior to be regulated-in determining whether a
particular initiative is worthwhile.
In the case of marriage promotion, these invariable difficulties in effectively
translating aim into achievement are magnified by several factors.
First, the behavioral patterns that marriage-promotion initiatives seek to alter
seem to be deeply rooted within the conditions of modern life. 178 We saw in Part
Two that the decline of marriage is a world-wide phenomenon that cuts across
geographic and cultural boundaries. Behavior so embedded in the economic and
social fabric is relatively resistant to changes in law and government policy. As
sociologist William Goode put it:
[T]he family is so intertwined with other social structures that it is
not possible to transform it without reversing a multitude of other trends
in modern social life.... I know of no great civilization that at the height
of its power and material splendor ever changed its grand onward
movement, except by dissolution and military defeat. Certainly none ever
did so by conscious social planning.
179
Law and policy can, in Goode's words, "have an effect at the margins." Thus
"those who are not totally determined to divorce are influenced by restrictive laws
and administrative hurdles that make divorce more difficult... [and] legal and
administrative restrictions create formidable barriers for the poor."'1 80 But
designing programs capable of achieving significant marginal effects is not easy.
These already very large difficulties are magnified by the fact that we lack
both an understanding of the behaviors marriage promotion would seek to reverse
and proven strategies for altering those behaviors. Both the trends against stable
marriage and marital childbearing are poorly understood. So are the means by
which individuals produce successful marriages. Thus, unsurprisingly, we do not
have proven methods of transforming unsuccessful relationships into successful
ones or reversing the larger social patterns.
178 See Part II supra.
179 GOODE, supra note 167, at 318.
8
' Id. at 323.
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The last, but by no means the least, difficulty in devising effective policies is
the fact that marital failure and nonmarriage are both consistently associated with
disadvantage. In the United States, nonmarital birth and divorce are strongly linked
with poverty, a poor education, unemployment, and relational violence.' 81 None of
these circumstances promote high-quality relationships or relational skills, and it is
not obvious that marriage promotion which ignores these risk factors can succeed.
In sum, a successful marriage-promotion initiative must strike a delicate and
difficult balance: because only low-conflict marriage produces benefit, the
initiative must promote harmonious marriages and childbearing within such
relationships, and it must do so without also encouraging highly conflicted
marriages or childbearing within these relationships. But human behavior is never
easy to alter and, in the case of marriage promotion, we cannot yet explain either
the individual behaviors that determine family formation or the worldwide trend
against stable marriage; we also lack proven strategies for altering those behaviors
and trends. Adding to these difficulties, both marital conflict and nonmarital
childbearing are strongly associated with other serious life problems-difficulties
that may significantly contribute to relational choice and dysfunction-and which
no initiative aimed solely at marriage promotion can cure.
This assessment suggests that any and all marriage-promotion initiatives,
however well intended, will confront daunting difficulties in translating aim into
achievement. Skepticism about the success of such initiatives is warranted and
appropriate.
B. What, IfAny, Marriage-Promotion Initiatives Are Worthwhile?
Given the difficulties with which marriage-promotion efforts must contend,
are there any marriage-promotion initiatives which seem likely to produce
significant net benefits at reasonable cost? This section critically evaluates some of
the more popular marriage-promotion initiatives.
1. Divorce Reform
Divorce-reform initiatives have been urged by many marriage-promotion
advocates. Such initiatives would be supported by the research data if-and only
if-they have the capacity to retard divorce in low-conflict relationships without
hindering it in high-conflict relationships. This is not an easy balance to strike, and
an initial question is whether there are enough low-conflict divorces to make such
an effort worthwhile.
While more research would be useful, the available data suggest that low-
conflict divorce is actually quite common. Amato and Booth, whose longitudinal
research was important in establishing that divorce produces advantages for
children in the context of a high-conflict marriage, found that less than a third of
parental divorces they studied involve highly conflicted relationships; "only 28%
18l See supra notes 155-162.
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of parents who divorced during the study reported any sort of spousal physical
abuse prior to divorce, [only] 30% reported more than two serious quarrels in the
last month, and [only] 23% reported that they disagreed 'often' or 'very often' with
their spouses., 182 Given these data, initiatives targeted at the low-conflict divorce
population appear to be warranted.
However, the most popular divorce-reduction initiatives do not, in fact, target
low-conflict marriages. Instead, they focus on "slow[ing]the rush to divorce" and
"restor[ing] some power to the spouse who wants to keep the marriage together"
through the introduction of lengthier divorce waiting periods or the restriction of
"no-fault" divorce to cases in which the spouses agree.1 83 Linda Waite and Maggie
Gallagher make fairly representative claims on behalf of enhanced waiting periods;
they argue that such periods would "give some weight to the marriage vow,"
provide spouses with "a chance to fully consider counseling and reconciliation
before becoming entangled in new relationships," and grant spouses who are
reluctant to divorce "a 'breathing spell' in which to emotionally recover before
facing the extensive and complicated legal decision that divorce entails."
'1 84
These claims ignore the fact that all marriages are not equally worth saving.
Nor is it at all obvious that waiting periods would either reduce spousal conflict or
even provide the "breathing period" that Waite and Gallagher contemplate. Lack of
a divorce decree will not deter spouses who want to hastily enter new relationships
from doing so, and a waiting period cannot insulate a reluctant spouse from
contemplating the realities of divorce; those realities present themselves upon
marital breakdown and separation whether or not a final divorce decree is
immediately available. Reforms that would confine no-fault divorce to cases of
spousal agreement have the capacity to resolve none of these problems; .indeed, the
lack of an agreement might well be an indicator of a high-conflict relationship.
In evaluating the merits of no-fault reform initiatives, it is also important to
keep in mind that the evidence fails to show that such reforms would have a
significant impact even on the overall divorce rate. The introduction of no-fault
divorce was associated with a short-term increase in divorce rates, but there is no
consensus among experts that it has had any longer term effect.1 85 Nor did
182 AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 141, at 220; see also HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note
168, at 34 (reporting that about a third of sample of divorced wives cited lack of shared interests and
unfair division of domestic labor as major sources of marital dissatisfaction and that a quarter cited
alcoholism, physical abuse, or extramarital sex).
183 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 3, at 195-96; see also Michael J. McManus, Why Is It
in the Government's Interest to Save Marriages?, WebMemo #80, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://
www.heritage.org/Research/Family/WM80.cfm.
184 WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 3, at 196.
185 See also Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A
Reconciliation and New Results, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1802, 1802 (2006), available at http://bpp.whart
on.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Divorce(AER).pdf. Compare Ira Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Dissolving
the Relationship Between Divorce Rates and Divorce Laws, 18 INT'L J. ECON. 341, 341 (1998), and
Norval Glenn, Further Discussion of the Effects of No-Fault Divorce on Divorce Rates, 59 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 800, 801 (1999) (finding that no-fault divorce laws do not increase the divorce
rate) with Douglas W. Allen, The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and Divorce, in THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 191, 191 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthom eds.,
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universal fault rules stem the century-long rise in divorce that preceded the no-fault
era. 186 Perhaps most tellingly, there is still a handful of states-Mississippi, New
York, Tennessee' 87-- that continue to require mutual consent as the precondition to
a no-fault divorce in at least some cases. Yet Tennessee has one of the highest
divorce rates in the nation,1 88 and the divorce rates of both Mississippi and New
York are quite comparable to those of neighboring states with mutual-consent
requirements. 189 Of course, it is possible that divorce rates in Mississippi, New
York, and Tennessee would be even higher if they lacked restrictive divorce rules.
But there is no evidence that this is so. Instead, it seems likely that restrictive rules
simply do not make a difference.
The capacity of restrictive divorce rules to alter divorce rates is also impeded
by the possibility of spousal collusion. Indeed, a major reason for the introduction
of no-fault divorce grounds during the 1960s was research showing that spouses
often colluded to manufacture grounds for divorce. 190 The collusion factor is a
prime reason why proposals to restore fault divorce rarely go beyond a lengthier
waiting period or a consent requirement; there would be no point. As long as a
state retains fault grounds that permit divorce without a wait, spouses who agree
about the desirability of a divorce can easily avoid waiting periods by colluding to
manufacture fault grounds.
The fact that divorce rates in Mississippi, New York, and Tennessee are not
lower than divorce rates in states with unilateral no-fault divorce also suggests that
cases in which one spouse wants a divorce and the other wants to resist it are rare,
too rare to have any impact on the divorce statistics. It is easy to understand why
this would be so: what is the point of preserving a marriage that one's spouse is
determined to leave? Indeed, given the increased social acceptability of
cohabitation, the spouse who wants a divorce and is unable to get one will
probably decide to to end his or her marriage in fact, if not in law. And in those
few cases in which one spouse does want to resist a divorce, mutual-consent rules
may simply exacerbate conflict and increase litigation costs.
In sum, no-fault divorce reforms are unsupported by the research evidence
and should be resisted: such reforms are poorly calibrated to deter divorce in low-
2002), and Rogers et al., Did No-Fault Divorce Legislation Matter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes
No, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 803, 804 (1999) (finding that no-fault divorce laws did increase the
divorce rate).
186 See RODERICK PHILLIPS, UNTYING THE KNOT 200-13 (1991) (comparing U.S. and European
divorce rates from mid-nineteenth century through mid-1980s).
187 See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (1976) (requiring agreement on custody and financial issues
or agreement to adjudicate those issues as condition of irreconcilable-differences divorce); N.Y. DOM.
REL. L. § 170 (6) (McKinney 2003) (requiring one-year separation pursuant to written spousal
agreement as condition of no-fault divorce); TENN. CODE § 36-4-103 (1996) (requiring a written
spousal agreement making adequate provisions for children as a precondition to divorce based on
irreconcilable differences).
188 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 21, at 88 tbl. 118 (showing Tennessee divorce rate of
6.5 per 1000 and only five states with higher rates).
189 See id.
190 Collusion was widespread throughout the fault era. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 174, at
536 (summarizing data and citing studies).
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conflict relationships and have the potential to enhance and prolong marital stress
in high-conflict relationships. The problem of spousal collusion also greatly
diminishes the capacity of divorce grounds, even if differently formulated, to
separate marriages worth preserving from those that should be terminated. Spouses
who agree can evade the formal requirements, and the law is powerless to prevent
them from doing so.
2. Marriage Incentives and Penalties
a. Creating Marriage Incentives
Although no marriage advocates have argued in favor of universal marriage
incentives, inducements targeted at the poor have figured prominently in the
marriage-promotion agenda. Federal welfare reforms adopted in 1996 encouraged
the states to adopt such measures and, in 2005, nine states offered financial
marriage-inducements to welfare recipients.' 91 It is easy to see why marriage-
promotion efforts might target the poor; they have the lowest rate of marriage and
the highest rate of nonmarital birth. Given these statistics, incentive programs
targeted at the poor would be appropriate if they had the capacity to effectively
promote low-conflict, long-term relationships.
However, none of the available evidence suggests that incentive programs do
have this capacity. The first problem with inducement programs is that they
encourage marriage per se and thus are not calibrated to foster enduring, low-
conflict partnerships. Making matters worse, the research reports suggest that the
poor single mothers who are targeted by these initiatives disproportionately have
low-quality relationships. As we saw in Part Four, low-income unmarried mothers
typically report that they have not married their children's fathers because of
serious relationship problems such as violence, addiction, criminal misbehavior,
and chronic conflict, 192 problems that are strongly associated with both relationship
failure and poor outcomes for children.1
93
The case of Angela Whitiker, a former welfare recipient profiled in the New
York Times, illustrates these problems. Whitiker had her first child at fifteen,
dropped out of the tenth grade, and a decade later "landed aimless and on public
assistance with five children by nearly as many men.', 194 Whitiker did marry during
this decade, but the relationship did not last and brought no apparent benefit to her
or her children. Another decade later, however, Whitaker had finished nursing
school as vice president of her class and with academic awards. She had passed her
state licensing exam and was gainfully employed. And she had done so after
191 See Lyman, supra note 8, at A16 (reporting that nine states offered welfare recipients
financial incentives to marry).
192 See supra notes 160-162.
193 See supra notes 150-152, 167-168. The research data also shows that marriage to a
stepparent does not confer the same emotional benefits to children as does marriage to a parent. See
supra note 153.
194 See Isabel Wilkerson, Angela Whitiker's Climb, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at AI, A22-24.
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encouragement by the man who ultimately became her second husband-a man
who was not only college-educated, but also employed, stable, and extremely
supportive of both Whitiker and her children. Commenting on Whitiker's story,
Professor Sara McLanahan, director of the Fragile Families Study cited frequently
in this article, argued that: "A good relationship is part of the story. But it can't be
any relationship .... This case underscores that it must be a healthy
relationship."' 95
McLanahan urged that "[t]he liberals are wrong because they're too
dismissive of marriage."'1 96 But she also stressed that, for marriage to confer
benefits, "[i]t can't be [with] any man."'197 Marriage-incentive initiatives that
ignore this fairly obvious basic cannot achieve useful results and should be
avoided. Marriage-inducement programs do ignore this basic and thus should be
abandoned.
b. Eliminating Marriage Penalties
Many marriage advocates have urged elimination of so-called marriage
"penalties" that give cohabitants favorable treatment under various tax and public
benefit programs. The aim of these measures is not to entice couples into marriage,
but to avoid deterring them from entering into formal marriages. Penalty-reduction
initiatives thus do not present the same problems posed by marriage-inducement
programs. Indeed, the procedural benefits associated with formal marriage lend
support to such initiatives.
However, as we saw in Part Three, the elimination of marriage penalties
presents complex regulatory problems because the rules that result in a marriage
penalty in one case often produce a marriage "reward" in other cases. Moreover,
the rules that produce these penalties and rewards rely on the assumption that a
married couple represents an economic unit in which the income of one spouse is
fully available to the other; the evidence suggests that this assumption is fully
warranted for marriage partners, but not for cohabitants, whose relationships tend
to be brief and relatively uncommitted. Equity, in particular the principle that like
cases should receive like treatment, thus tends to support the marital-status rules
that sometimes give rise to marriage penalties. But the social acceptability of
cohabitation creates opportunities for rule evasion, and evasion creates different
equity problems. Rule evasion also has the effect of substituting informal for
formal marriage, resulting in a loss of the procedural benefits that flow from
formal marital relationships.
Finding the right balance between these competing considerations is no
simple matter, and the cost of eliminating marriage penalties can be very high. The
various pension systems administered by the U.S. government offer an instructive
195 Isabel Wilkerson, A Success Story That's Hard to Duplicate, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at
A24.
196 Id.
197 Id.; see also HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 168, at 251 (concluding that "most
important potentially protective factor [against divorce] is the selection of a mate").
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example bf the problems. All of these systems penalize remarriage, 198 but over
time each system has dramatically reduced the impact of such penalties by
exempting remarriages that take place after a specified age, typically fifty-five or
sixty; later marriages produce no benefit penalty. 199 The theory here is simply that
when remarriage takes place relatively late in life, both partners will often be living
on fixed incomes and "[t]he prospect of one partner losing financial benefits as a
result of the marriage is a real disincentive" that is not operable at younger ages
when one or both spouses are employed and the benefit entitlement is far-off 'and
unrealized.200 The available evidence supports this theory; 20 1 the current approach
thus appears to represent a well-calibrated response to the evasion problem.
However, within some federal pension systems-particularly Social Security,
the largest and most important-the evasion cure has created a serious equity
problem. The way Social Security is structured, a retirement-age spouse obtains
either a "primary benefit" based on his own work history or a "spouse" benefit
equal to fifty percent of the primary wage-earner's retirement benefits or a
combined benefit; a widow(er) receives one hundred percent of the deceased
wage-earner's benefit if it exceeds his own.2 °2 Thus if Ann and Bill were entitled to
$1500 as a married couple, representing $1000 in primary benefits and $500 in
spouse benefits, Ann would be entitled to $1000 in benefits after Bill's death. If
Ann remarries Charles-who is also entitled to $1000 in primary benefits-after
Bill's death, she and Charles would retain $2000 in benefits. The current system
thus eliminates any incentive to commit fraud through non-marriage, but the cost is
substantial disparity in the benefits paid to intact-marriage and second-marriage
couples with identical earnings records. This equity problem is compounded by the
fact that spousal benefits are unaffected by the wage-earner's own Social Security
contributions.
At one time, it was thought that spousal benefits would fade away as more
and more women, the almost exclusive recipients of these benefits, had their own
earnings records on which to obtain a primary award. But:
198 See Hearing on H.R. 1108, H.R. 2095, H.R. 2222, and H.R. 3731 Before the H. Subcomm.
on Benefits of the H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter: Bilirakis]
(statement of Rep. Michael Bilirakis), available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule 107/ap
r02/4-11-02/mbilirak.htm (showing remarriage penalty rules by program).
'99 See id. and 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)(1)(A), 402(e)(3),
402(f)(1)(A), 402(f)(4) (2006) (Social Security); 38 U.S.C. §§ 103(d)(2)(B), 1311 and'101(b) (2006)
(Veteran's Benefits).
200 Bilirakis, supra note 198 (noting legal disincentives to marry among persons aged fifty-five
and older).
201 See Michael J. Brien et al., Widows Waiting to Wed? (Re)Marriage and Economic
Incentives in Social Security Widow Benefits 24-25 (Off. Res. Evaluation Stat., Working Paper No.
89, 2001), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp89.pdf (finding that the
age-sixty remarriage rule affects the timing of marriage and has the most influence on women who
are very close to age sixty).
202 Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 104, 75 Stat. 131 (1961); Social
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 102, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972). Benefits for young
widows caring for children have remained constant at 75% since 1939. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(2)
(2004).
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[N]umerous amendments, combined with the growth in Social Security
coverage, made it increasingly easy for women to qualify for spouse
benefits. The dramatic improvement in basic benefits and in the widow's
entitlement as a percentage of the primary insurance amount
substantially raised the value of such secondary benefits. Although more
women qualify for retirement benefits, the present retired-worker
formula, together with women's wage and work patterns, often keeps
those benefits below wife or widow entitlements. ... Over twenty
percent of the women currently receiving retired-worker benefits also
receive secondary spouse benefits, compared to fifteen percent at the end
of 1966 and less than ten percent at the end of 1956.203
Spouse benefits are thus .expected to remain an important part of Social
Security for a long time to come, despite the fact that "[b]ehind the many spouse-
benefit amendments lay no clear scheme or consistent rationale., 20 4
The only possible equity fixes that do not restore evasion-through-
nonmarriage incentives are schemes that would ensure women primary-benefit
amounts comparable to those of men. One could do this by raising the minimum
Social Security payment, utilizing a "community property" approach that treats a
married wage-earner's pension contributions as the property of both spouses,
introducing a "homemaker's disregard" that ignores gaps in earnings records
occasioned by child care and homemaking, or through some combination of these
approaches. 205 All of these options would cost money. None would resolve all of
the equity issues. For example, today's system, in which widows typically retain
about two-thirds of total Social Security benefits, insures that widows who do not
remarry avoid a marked living standard loss. Systems that phase out the survivor's
benefit by ensuring that most couples have relatively equal Social Security benefits
would protect widows against living-standard loss much less well.
I have gone into Social Security at such length for three reasons: it is a large
and important entitlement; it admirably demonstrates the complexity and high cost
of designing entitlement rules that both avoid the Scylla of evasion and the
Charybdis of inequity; finally-perhaps most importantly-it demonstrates the
need to target costly penalty-elimination policies narrowly and at populations
where the public interest in marital unions is highest..
203 Peter W. Martin, Social Security Benefits for Spouses, (2005) http://www.law.comell.edu/so
csec/springOl/readings/spouses.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). In 2002, 61% of women aged sixty-
two or older who received social security benefits collected values based on their husbands' work
histories. 54% of this group collected spousal benefits because their own work histories did not
qualify them for social security benefits, and 46% collected spousal benefits because their own work
histories produced smaller benefit values. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION,
& STATISTICS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 2003, at 5.25
tbl.5.A14, G.8-G.9 (2004).
204 Martin, supra note 203, at § II.
20 See id. at § VII.
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Does marriage provide enough public benefits to justify Social Security's
penalty-elimination policy? To conclusively answer this question, we would need
to know both the likelihood and direct costs of rule evasion through non-marriage,
as well as the direct costs of rules that counter the evasion risk. We would also
need to know the indirect costs-in individual welfare, equity, and weakened
marital norms-of each approach. In the case of Social Security, we can only
guess at most of these variables. The data do enable us to say that Social Security's
targeted evasion strategy, which has focused exclusively and successfully on the
population presenting the highest evasion risk, is preferable to a broader and most
costly strategy. But it remains unclear whether the targeted strategy produces
sufficient benefits to justify its cost.
Although we lack the data to reach a firm conclusion about the ultimate merits
of the Social Security penalty-reduction scheme, it also seems unlikely that Social
Security is the program in which marriage-penalty elimination will produce the
greatest public benefits. Allegiance to marital norms is probably higher among
elderly couples than their younger counterparts. The elderly also have a relatively
low poverty rate 20 6 and thus may be less susceptible to financial motivators than
are poorer segments of the population. Moreover, elderly couples seldom bear or
raise children, and benefits to children represent one of' the most important
justifications for marriage promotion.
These various considerations suggest that Social Security is a less desirable
target for penalty-elimination efforts than, for example, the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). The EITC is the primary tax benefit for poor families, who have the
lowest marriage rate and highest rate of nonmarital birth. Because of their
straightened circumstances, there is reason to believe that the poor are more
susceptible to financial disincentives than the general population; many young
unmarried couples also say that lack of financial stability is an important factor in
their failure to marry.207
Under current EITC rules, a low-income mother can obtain as much as $4000
in tax credits for herself and her children if she remains unmarried.20 8 But if she
marries, she loses a significant portion of those credits even if she marries a man
who also qualifies for the credit. Although revisions to the tax code adopted in
2001 reduced the EITC marriage penalty, they by no means eliminated it. One pair
of commentators calculates that the same low-income woman who lost $2500 .in
credits after marrying before 2001 continued to lose $1900 after 2001.209 The
poverty threshold for a three-person family is less than $16,000;210 at this income
level, $1900 might well sway some marriage decisions.
206 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 21, at 453 tbl.686.
207 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 51, at 111-17; Andrew J. Cherlin, The
Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 848, 855-56 (2004); Smock et
al., supra note 1 19,.at 692-93.
208 See Will Marshall & Isabel V. Sawhill, Progressive Family Policy in the Twenty-First
Century, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 198, 215 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004).
209 See id.
210 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY THRESHOLDS 2004, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/poverty/threshid/thresh04.html ($15,067).
[Vol. 10
REVIVING MARRIAGE
In contrast to the divorce-reform and financial-incentive strategies advocated
by marriage-promotion advocates, we cannot simply dismiss initiatives aimed at
eliminating marriage penalties: Rule-evasion that substitutes informal for formal
marriage produces certain procedural costs. To the extent that formal marriage
promotes marital commitment and stability, rule-evasion may also contribute to the
decline of enduring, high-quality marriage. Both of these concerns support the
elimination of marriage penalties. However, marriage-penalty elimination is not
cost-free, and the available data are not adequate to effectively compare the costs
of elimination with its benefits. We can safely say that narrowly targeted initiatives
are better than broad ones; the evidence also suggests that initiatives targeted at
poor parents and would-be parents are more likely to yield positive net benefits
than are those targeted at the elderly. But far more research will be necessary
before definitive conclusions can be reached.
3. Public Education: General and Targeted
Most marriage-promotion advocates have urged public information
campaigns designed to extol the benefits of marriage, and the Bush administration
has included such campaigns within its Healthy Marriage Initiative. Advocates
justify this strategy as an appropriate public health intervention; if government
exhorts the public to stop smoking and start exercising because these activities
promote health, they urge, should it not also exhort the public to enter into healthy
marriages?
However, although advocates of public information campaigns rely on a
public health model, the results of various public health initiatives do not suggest
that campaigns directed at the general public will bear much fruit. Public health
campaigns that seek to alter behavior have been markedly less successful than
those that focus on the environment in which disease flourishes, and campaigns
that target simple behaviors have been more successful than those that target
complex behaviors.2 11 Educational initiatives also seem to work best when coupled
with other incentives-criminal liability, taxes, use restrictions-as they have been
in campaigns against smoking, drunk driving, and nonuse of seatbelts. Finally, it is
far from clear how government could couple a pro-marriage message with an
inducement that did not promote undesirable marriages as well as healthy ones.
The opinion-poll evidence also suggests that education about the benefits of
marriage is not needed. As we saw in Part Two, these polls show high regard for
marriage and widespread appreciation of its benefits.212 If the public already
appreciates the benefits of a successful marriage, public education would seem to
be unnecessary.
a. Targeted Campaigns:
21 See generally INST. OF MED. COMM. FOR STUDY OF FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, Div. OF HEALTH
CARE SERVS., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 112-13 (1988); F. DOUGLAS SCUTCHFIELD & WILLIAM
KECK, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE (2002).
212 See supra notes 45-52.
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Targeted educational campaigns hold considerably more promise than
campaigns aimed at the general public. For example, public surveys show that
most members of the public are not aware that low-conflict marriage tends to serve
children better than a divorce,213 and even divorcing parents are frequently
"unaware that children who grow up with only one parent are more likely to have
problems.l 4 It would not be difficult to inform parents who file for divorce of the
facts and encourage them to act on them:
Although maintaining an unhappy but low conflict marriage entails a
degree of sacrifice from spouses, this situation may not be as onerous as
some might think. Most adults live more than two-thirds of their lives
without children in the household. Spending one-third of one's life living
in a marriage that is less than satisfactory in order to benefit children-
children that parents elected to bring into the world-is not an
unreasonable expectation. This idea is especially compelling, given that
many people who divorce and remarry find that their second marriage is
no happier than their first. Furthermore, such an arrangement provides an
important benefit for parents that helps to balance the cost: parents-
especially fathers-are able to maintain continuous relations with
coresident children. Given the pain experienced by most noncustodial
parents following separation from their children, this should be an
incentive to invest extra effort in the marital relationship.215
A limited educational initiative of this type would not be costly; about half of
U.S. counties already offer or mandate attendance at educational programs for
divorcing parents.216 These programs could easily be expanded to provide conflict
assessment, information- on the harms associated with parental conflict, and
encouragement to both preserve low-conflict relationships and to minimize conflict
when divorce occurs. We do not know how many parents would act on what they
learned, but parents often do make sacrifices in their children's interests, and
existing divorce-education programs, despite typically short durations, have shown
213 See, e.g., Walter Kim, Should You Stay Together for the Kids?, TIME, Sept. 25, 2000, at 74
(asking in a 2000 survey if "children are better off in an unhappy marriage in. which parents stay
together mainly for the kids or a divorce in which the parents are more happy?," 66% said children
were better off with a divorce, 23% said an unhappy marriage, and 11% said they were not sure).
214 MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 137, at 144.
215 AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 141, at 238.
216 See Robing J. Geelhoed et al., Status of Court-Connected Programs for Children Whose
Parents Are Separating or Divorcing, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 393, 393 (2001); see also Debra A. Clement,
1998 Nationwide Survey of the Legal Status of Parent Education, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV.
219, 222 (1999) (reporting that, in 1998, eleven states mandated attendance at parent-education
programs).
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considerable promise in reducing post-divorce litigation and increasing positive
parental interactions.
217
Parents' inclination to act in their children's interest also suggests that
targeted public information campaigns designed to educate young adults about the
risks of nonmarital childbearing are worth trying. Although nonmarital birth is
strongly associated with childhood instability and a wide range of associated
disadvantages, 218 the young men and women who decide to put parenting before
marriage may be ignorant 6f these disadvantages. High school sex education
programs could forcefully make these disadvantages clear; because sex education
programs are virtually universal, such a targeted campaign would also be
extremely cheap.
Of course, the provision of accurate information about the sequelae of
nonmarital birth does not insure that young adults will make rational choices based
on that information. Teenagers often exhibit poor judgment about risk, and public
health experts agree that "the main threats to adolescents' health are... the health-
risk behaviors and choices they make., 219 But given the extremely low cost of such
an initiative, even a very small impact would be positive. There is also some
evidence suggesting that teens do heed information about unpleasant
consequences; for example, some studies suggest that strict child support
enforcement can reduce nonmarital childbearing.22°
In sum, we cannot expect miracles from targeted public education campaigns,
but their low cost and lack of obvious negative side effects suggests that such
programs are worth trying, testing, and refining.
4. Reducing Marital Conflict
217 See Jack Arbuthnot et al., Patterns of Relitigation Following Divorce Education, 35 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 269, 274 (1997) (finding that, 2.25 years after divorce, parents who attended
a parent-education program had significantly lower rates of relitigation than a control group); CTR.
FOR DIVORCE EDUC., OVERVIEW OF CHILDREN IN THE MIDDLE OUTCOME STUDIES, available at http://w
ww.divorce-education.com/research.htm (reviewing research).
218 See supra Part III. B. 3.
219 Michael D. Resnick et al., Protecting Adolescents from Harm: Findings from the National
Longitudinal Study on Adolescent Health, 278 JAMA 823, 823 (1997); see also MARSHA GARRISON
& CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION
580-84 (2002) (describing evidence on adolescent risk-taking behavior).
220 See ROBERT D. PLOTNICK ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT POLICY ON
NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING 18, 31, tbl.3 (2005), available at http://www.economics.ucr.edu/seminar
s/spring05/ped/5-4-O5Robert%20Plotnick.pdf (finding a significant association between state child
support policies and nonmarital birth, with larger effects for adolescent women); Robert D. Plotnick
et al., Better Child Support Enforcement: Can It Reduce Teenage Premarital Childbearing?, 25 J.
FAM. ISSUES 634, 634 (2004) (reporting that during the early 1980s, teens living in states with higher
rates of paternity establishment were less likely to become unwed mothers).
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As data on the divide between high- and low-conflict marriages has mounted,
increasing numbers of marriage-promotion advocates have called for government
programs aimed at improving conflict-management skills and reducing marital
tensions. Heeding this call, the Bush administration has undertaken a "Healthy
Marriage Initiative" that provides federal funds for demonstration projects
involving relationship skills training and mentoring; a number of states have taken
similar steps.22' Certainly, the goals of these initiatives are supported by the
research data; the question is whether they are capable of producing significant
effects.
There are relationship-skills programs that have shown promising results. A
recent meta-analysis of all program reviews that met rigorous experimental-design
criteria found that:
[M]arriage and relationship programs provide benefits for the couples
they serve. Average effect sizes of .68 for relationship satisfaction and
.26 for relationship communication indicate that in these programs
evaluated, the couples that received treatment made significant gains in
satisfaction when compared to couples that did not receive the
treatment.222
However, the researchers who conducted the evaluation caution that all but
seven of the studies included in the analysis assessed outcomes only at the
beginning and end of the studied intervention, without any follow-up. Among the
handful of studies that did conduct later assessments, the median follow-up period
was only 2.5 months.223 We thus lack evidence that these programs have the
capacity to effect long-term relationship improvements.
Nor have any of the "successful" programs been tested in the disadvantaged
populations that are most at risk of poor quality relationships, 224 and low-income
couples pose a number of special challenges for conflict-reduction programs.
Researchers have also found that economic hardship is associated with relationship
conflict 225 and, in addition to these economic stresses, that:
[t]he prevalence of traumatic experiences such as childhood sexual abuse
may be higher among disadvantaged individuals and may make it harder
to form healthy adult relationships.... [L]ow-income couples often
221 See supra notes 7-8.
222 JANE REARDON-ANDERSON ET AL., SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF MARRIAGE AND
RELATIONSHIP PROGRAMS 23 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411142_impa
ct_marriage.pdf; see also M. Robin Dion, Healthy Marriage Programs: Learning What Works, in 15
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 139, 141-44 (2005).
223 See REARDON-ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 222, at 15, 23.
221 See id. at 23-24; Dion, supra note 222 at 142, 144.
225 See Patricia Clark-Nicolas & Bernadette Gray-Little, Effect of Economic Resources on
Marital Quality in African-American Married Couples, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 645, 653 (1991);
Rand D. Conger et al., Linking Economic Hardship to Marital Quality and Stability, 52 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 643, 643 (1990); Smock et al., supra note 119, at 680.
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struggle with issues related to having children by multiple
partners.... Experts who work with low-income families [also] tend to
find conventional teaching methods, such as lectures and didactic
instruction, inappropriate for the literacy levels and learning styles
prevalent among lower income populations.
226
The administration's Healthy Marriage Initiative is funding pilot programs
with low-income couples, but until program evaluations. have been completed, we
cannot determine whether the relationship-skills programs that have shown
promise in middle-class populations can achieve equivalent results in
disadvantaged groups.227
There is also evidence that marriage counseling can produce harm as well as
good. Some studies have found that a significant percentage of couples who enter
marital therapy, perhaps as many as a quarter, are actually worse off afterward than
they were when they started; post-therapy divorce rates also remain very high.228
In sum, relationship-skills programs certainly seem worth trying and testing.
Until careful evaluations show significant results, however, these programs are not
worth a major investment of public funds. We simply do not know if they will
work.
5. Reducing Nonmarital Births
Just about every marriage-promotion advocate has urged initiatives to reduce
nonmarital births, particularly among teenage parents who are at high risk of
multiple out-of-wedlock pregnancies. The research evidence supports these
initiatives just as it does relationship-skills programs. Although the data show that
those who have nonmarital children typically fail to marry because of low-quality
relationships, most of these parents eventually do marry; if they could be
persuaded to delay childbearing until they have found the right relationship, or at
the very least until they are more economically secure themselves, the evidence
suggests that both children and parents would be better off. Nonmarital birth also
produces large public costs. In the United States, more than eighty percent of
unmarried teen mothers receive public benefits of some type, even after welfare
reforms designed to discourage out-of-wedlock childbearing. 229 Most other
industrialized nations do more than the United States to reduce poverty among
single-parent families, 230 but this largesse necessitates large public transfers. In
addition to these immediate monetary outlays, the disadvantages suffered by
226 Dion, supra note 222, at 144-45.
227 See id at 147-50 (describing the federal program and projected evaluations).
228 See Susan Gilbert, Married With Problems? Therapy May Not Help, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2005, at Fl, F6 (reporting research findings showing that, two years after ending marriage
counseling, 25% of couples were worse off and, four years after counseling, 83% were divorced).229 See Acs & KOBALL, supra note 50, at 4.
230 See UNICEF, supra note 149, at fig. 1.
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nonmarital children may produce long-term costs in terms of adult success and
productivity.231
However, although the evidence supporting initiatives to discourage early
nonmarital childbearing is strong enough that even opponents of marriage
promotion typically favor programs to reduce teen pregnancy, we know very little
about how to effectively design such programs. While the U.S. teen pregnancy and
birth rate did decline markedly during the 1990s, the United States still has the
highest teen pregnancy rate in the developed world, a rate twice that of Great
Britain and ten times that of the Netherlands.232 Although we know that the decline
in teen births reflects less sex and more contraceptive use, it also remains unclear
why these shifts occurred. Nor has this inexplicable success produced a drop in the
overall nonmarital birth rate; women in their early twenties have increased their
nonmarital childbearing as teenagers have reduced theirs.233
Much of the debate has focused on sex education, more particularly
"abstinence-only" education versus "abstinence-plus" education. The jury is still
out on the merits of both approaches. The effectiveness of abstinence-only
programs is completely unproven; a well-designed federal evaluation of
abstinence-only programs is underway, but not yet complete.23 a A few abstinence-
plus programs have shown reductions in age at sexual initiation, but reports of
longer-term results are rare and reports of nonmarital birth reduction are lacking. 235
The life circumstances that tend to promote nonmarital birth also suggest that
sex education alone will prove unable to produce significant, long-term results.
Nonmarital and teenage birth is highly correlated not just with socioeconomic and
educational disadvantage, but also with instability, trauma, and lack of motivation.
231 See SAUL D. HOFFMAN, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, BY THE NUMBERS:
THE PUBLIC COSTS OF TEEN CHILD BEARING 14-16 (2006), available at http://www.teenpregnancy.or
g/costs/pdf/report/BTN_National Report.pdf
232 See DOUGLAS KIRBY, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, EMERGING
ANSWERS: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TEENAGE PREGNANCY 2 (2001), available
at http://www.teenpregnancy.org/resources/data/pdf/emeranswsum.pdf; PLANNED PARENTHOOD
FEDERATION OF AM., REDUCING TEENAGE PREGNANCY, 1-3 (2000), available at http://www.plannedp
arenthood.org/library/TEEN-PREGNANCY/Reducing.html. "
233 See Joyce A. Martin et al., NAT'L CTR. HEALTH STAT., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2000 9 fig.3
(2002) (noting that the nonmarital birthrate in the United States for teenaged mothers ages fifteen to
nineteen decreased from 1995 to 2000, while the nonmarital birthrate among women aged twenty to
twenty-four increased during the same period); see also Isabel V. Sawhill, Teenage Sex, Pregnancy,
and Nonmarital Births, 23 GENDER ISSUES 48, 52-53 figs.5-6 (2006) (indicating that in the United
States, the percent of nonmarital births to teenage mothers decreased from 49% in 1995 to 28% in
2000).
234 See MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., FIRST-YEAR IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION
510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS (2005), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publi
cations/PDFs/firstyearabstinence.pdf. Interim results do show that the program participation was
associated with heightened perceptions of risks involved in teen sex and pregnancy; there is some
evidence that program participation also increased expectations of abstinence. See id. at 6.
235 See JENNIFER MANLOVE ET AL., NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, NOT YET:
PROGRAMS TO DELAY FIRST SEX AMONG TEENS 5-7 (2004), available at http://www.teenpreganacy.or
g/works/pdf/NotYet.pdf (noting that while some of the included groups do show reductions, the
effects are limited and short term).
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In one study of unmarried teen mothers, thirteen percent of the weighted sample
had been raped, forty-seven percent had been in a controlling or abusive
relationship, and twenty-four percent had no life plans; only sixty-one percent
lived with either parent, and most had recently moved.236 Young unmarried fathers
are just as likely to have deeply troubled lives. 237 And both young unmarried
fathers and young unmarried mothers tend to live in worlds where early
childbearing is common and successful marriage rare. In one study, almost seventy
percent of teen mothers had close friends or teen siblings who were already parents
or pregnant.2 38 Many of these young women "are so deeply engaged in a high-risk
lifestyle that they simply aren't thinking about where their actions might lead.
Depression and despondency spawned by difficult life situations sometimes stop
them from caring whether they become pregnant or not.'
239
Nor are young unmarried mothers necessarily interested in postponing
pregnancy. In interviews, they describe marriage "as a luxury" and children as "a
necessity, an absolutely essential part of a young woman's life, the chief source of
identity and meaning [and]... an opportunity to prove one's worth .. ,240 A
sizable minority thus report that they actually sought pregnancy, and many others
report that they did not care about avoiding it.241 Studies of the psychological
determinants of teenage pregnancy and childbearing also suggest that some
adolescents may have more ambivalence or preconscious motivation toward
childbearing than is detected in surveys using retrospective questions on pregnancy
242intention.
Many young unmarried fathers also seem to be motivated toward or
indifferent about parenthood. In one survey, fully half of the young women
interviewed reported that their baby's father had wanted them to conceive, and
women who reported that their partners had wanted them to get pregnant were
nearly fifteen times as likely as others to have intended the pregnancy.243 Surveys
of the fathers themselves report somewhat less enthusiasm for paternity, but a
236 See JENNIFER J. FROST & SELENE OSLAK, ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., TEENAGERS'
PREGNANCY INTENTIONS AND DECISIONS: A STUDY OF YOUNG WOMEN IN CALIFORNIA CHOOSING TO
GIVE BIRTH 9-10 tbl.2 (1999), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/or-teenspreg-survey.p
df. Lack of life plans was a highly significant correlate of pregnancy intentions. Id. at 13 tbl.4.
237 Robert F. Anda et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Risk of Paternity in Teen
Pregnancy, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 37, 41 (2002) (finding that each reported adverse
childhood experience was significantly associated with teen paternity risk); see also BEST
INTENTIONS, supra note 159, at 75-76.
238 FROST & OSLAK, supra note 236, at 9.
239 EDtN & KEFALAS, supra note 51, at 39.
240 Id. at 6.
241 See id. at 37, 237 tbl.5 (reporting that 17.2% of respondents intended to become pregnant,
37.7% did not, and 45.7% were "in between"); FROST & OSLAK, supra note 236, at 9 (reporting that
32% of respondents had intended to become pregnant, 25% had not cared and 43% had not intended
to become pregnant); Wendy D. Manning, Childbearing in Cohabiting Unions: Racial and Ethnic
Differences, 33 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 217, 221 (2001) (reporting that 44% of cohabiting and 61% of
single' noncohabiting women said that their first birth was unintended).
242 See FROST & OSLAK, supra note 236, at 6 (citing studies).
243 Id. at 12-13; see also EDN & KEFALAS, supra note 51, at 30-37 (describing cases in which
the father encouraged the mother to become pregnant).
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sizable number report that they were happy upon learning of the mother's
pregnancy, and many pregnancies seem to represent an event that is "unplanned
but not accidental. 244
Because many, if not the majority, of nonmarital pregnancies appear to result
from intention or indifference, it seems unlikely that either sex education programs
promoting abstinence or those promoting contraceptives are capable, on their own,
of achieving a major reduction in youthful nonmarital births. Sex education cannot
alter the attitudes and high-risk lifestyle that are so frequently associated with early
nonmarital pregnancy. Moreover, both young unmarried fathers and mothers
typically have access to contraceptives, but fail to use them.245
Given the life circumstances of young, unmarried parents, it should not
surprise us that one of the most successful teen pregnancy prevention programs
reported so far is not only "long-term, intensive, and expensive," but includes
components dealing with:
(1) family life and sex education, (2) individual academic assessment,
tutoring, help with homework, preparation for standardized exams, and
assistance with college entrance, (3) work-related activities, including a
job club, stipends, individual bank accounts, employment, and career
awareness, (4) self-expression through the arts, (5) sports activities, and
(6) comprehensive health care, including mental health and reproductive
health services and contraception.246
This program "is the first and only study to date that includes random
assignment, multiple sites, and a large sample size and that found a positive impact
on sexual and contraceptive behavior, pregnancy, and births among girls for as
long as three years.,, 247 And even this admirable, intensive, and expensive program
failed to make a difference in boys' risk-taking activities.
Certainly, pregnancy-prevention programs are worth trying, testing, and
refining. Further research is warranted and desirable. However, we do not yet
know whether such programs will prove capable of significant results.
6. A Summary
Reviewing these often-urged marriage-promotion initiatives, we can reject
some outright: Both divorce law revision and financial incentives apply too
244 See Timothy J. Nelson, Low-Income Fathers, 30 ANN. REV. Soc. 427, 432-33 (2004)
(reviewing studies).
245 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 51, at 37-46; FROST& OSTLAK, supra note 236, at 14 tbl.5
(reporting that 80% of respondents had used contraceptives at some point and 66.5% had received
contraceptive services from a clinic or doctor, but 63% reported that they had used no contraceptive
method during month when pregnancy occurred).
246 KIRBY, supra note 232, at 15.
2471Id. at 15-16.
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broadly; they cannot effectively promote well-functioning, enduring marriages,
and only those marriages. General public-education campaigns advertising the
virtues of a happy marriage seem unnecessary and meaningless; Americans almost
universally want such marriages, and those who do not have them surely need
more than exhortation to achieve the right results. Other proposed initiatives are
supported by the data, but we lack evidence that they can achieve significant
results. These initiatives-targeted public-information campaigns (aimed at low-
conflict couples contemplating divorce and teenagers at risk for early nonmarital
pregnancies), relationship-skills training, nonmarital and teen pregnancy
prevention-would be worthwhile if we could find strategies that work. But much
more research is necessary before large-scale funding is warranted.
C. The Missing Marriage-Promotion Initiative: Prevention
Across our review 'of proposed marriage initiatives, we have seen that the
various forms of disadvantage associated with nonmarriage and marital failure
impede our capacity to successfully promote happy and enduring marital
partnerships. Virtually every form of disadvantage-economic, educational,
psychological, social, and even geographical-appears to increase the risk of
nonmarital childbearing and unsuccessful partnering,248 and each form of
disadvantage magnifies the difficulty of altering the behaviors that lead to
nonmarriage and marital failure.
This should not surprise us; the same disadvantages are strongly associated
with other indicators of family dysfunction. For example, child maltreatment is
highly concentrated among disadvantaged families: a U.S. national incidence study
found that children from families with annual incomes below $15,000 were sixty
times more likely to die from maltreatment and twenty-two times more likely to be
seriously harmed by it than were children from families with annual incomes
above $30,000.249 Single and adolescent parenting, substance abuse, mental health
problems, adult family violence, and lack of social supports are all highly
correlated with child maltreatment; 250 these various maltreatment-risk factors are
also highly correlated with each other and with low socioeconomic status. 251
Because the risk factors that predict one form of family dysfunction tend to
predict other forms of family dysfunction, these risks also tend to be
geographically concentrated in poor neighborhoods. Thus, a British Columbia
researcher charted, between poor western Vancouver and wealthy eastern
248 See supra Part III. B. 3.
249 See A.J. SEDLAK & D.D. BROADHURST, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THIRD
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 5-51 (1996). Extreme poverty also tends
to be associated with more extreme abuse and neglect. See COMM. BEHAV. & SOC. SCIENCES & EDUC.,
LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK SETTINGS 19 (1993) (summarizing studies).
250 Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 590, 613-15 (2005) (summarizing research).
251 Id. at 615 (summarizing research); see also CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT
AND PUBLIC POLICY 23-156 (Aletha C. Huston ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (summarizing
research on links between poverty, parental dysfunction, and poor child outcomes).
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Vancouver, a six-fold difference in income to basic needs, a five-fold difference in
the proportion of children under twelve living with a single parent, a ten-fold
difference in adult education levels and access to child care, a nine-fold difference
in neighborhood crime, a fifty-fold difference in children's language and cognitive
development, a seventeen-fold difference in children's social development, and an
eighty-three-fold difference in child neglect.252 This geographic risk concentration
may also enhance the impact of individual risk factors.253
Although international comparisons are risky because of programmatic and
definitional differences, comparative data suggest that the United States is at the
bottom of the charts on many measures of family functioning. The United States
has long had the highest divorce rate in the industrialized world and, despite the
fact that a number of nations now have nonmarital birth rates equal to or higher
than that of the U.S., the proportion of U.S. children who live with a single parent
continues to top the cross-national charts.254 But it is not only family break-up in
which the United States leads the pack. U.S. childhood mortality rates are among
the highest in the industrialized world, 55 and a recent U.N. survey found that,
among twenty-six industrialized nations, children raised in the United States,
Mexico, and Portugal had the greatest chances of dying from neglect or other
forms of mistreatment. Indeed, the calculated death rate in the U.S. (twenty-four
per million) was twelve times higher than that of countries with the lowest rates
and three to four times that of countries with average records.256
Because the United States has a very high level of income inequality and a
very low level of support for families, socioeconomic factors appear to play an
unusually large role in producing these high levels of family break-up and
dysfunction. For example, various Scandinavian countries have nonmarital birth
rates exceeding that of the United States; roughly a third of U.S. births are
nonmarital, as compared to about half of all births in Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark, and almost two-thirds in Iceland.25 7 But these nations have lower rates
of single parenthood. Indeed, the proportion of children who are being raised by
252 See Ruth Annis, "Think Locally, Act Globally" Revisited: Finding Better Ways to Protect
Children and Youth in B.C. 25, Address at the British Columbia Provincial Court Judges Association
Conference (Nov. 21, 2002), available at http://www.cecw-cepb.ca/DocsEng/RuthAnnisSpeechToBC
PCJA.pdf.
253 See Anne R. Pebley & Narayan Sastry, Neighborhoods, Poverty, and Children's Well-
Being, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 119, 138-39 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) (reviewing literature).
254 See Smeeding et al., supra note 24, at 7-8 & figs.l.2 & 1.3 (comparing ten industrialized
nations).
255 See SUZANNE M. SMITH ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INJURY AND
CHILD ABUSE 299, 301 (1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Products&Pubs/D
atatoAction/pdf/Chlt4.pdf.256 See UNICEF, A LEAGUE TABLE OF CHILD DEATHS BY INJURY IN RICH NATIONS 3-5, 8 (2001),
available at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/repcard2e.pdf.
257 See M. V. Lee Badgett, Will Providing Marriage Rights to Same-Sex Couples Undermine
Heterosexual Marriage? Evidence from Scandinavia and the Netherlands (2004), available at http://
www.iglss.org/media/files/briefing.pdf (discussion paper prepared for the Council on Contemporary
Families and for the Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies).
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married parents is close to the proportion in the United States258 for the simple
reason that most nonmarital children are born to cohabiting couples, and a fairly
large proportion of these couples ultimately marry.2 59 The Scandinavian countries
also have comparatively low maltreatment and foster-care rates; the United States,
where about fifteen percent of children live in poverty, 260 has 75 perl0,000
children in state care, while Norway, with about four percent of children living in
poverty, has a placement rate approximately half that level.26'
Three crucial points emerge from these data: First, nonmarriage and relational
failure are often symptoms, as well as causes, of emotional and economic stress.
Second, the underlying stresses that promote nonmarriage and relationship failure
also promote a host of other, arguably far more serious, deficits in family
functioning. Third, reductions in the stresses associated with deficits in family
functioning should be associated with reductions in those deficits. Fourth,
economic stress probably plays a larger-than-typical role in promoting
nonmarriage and relationship failure in the United States because economic stress
is more profound and common here than elsewhere.
Marriage promotion represents, at bottom, a public health campaign, and
marriage-promotion advocates often rely on public health analogies and
metaphors. However, the fact that none of the marriage-promotion initiatives we
have considered address the disadvantages with which nonmarital childbearing and
relationship failure are associated suggests that marriage-promotion advocates
have failed to grasp the public health field's most important insight: an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.
The field of public health emerged during the nineteenth century along with
knowledge about the vectors by which disease was transmitted. Experts in this new
field aimed to promote health by altering disease-inducing conditions: they
concentrated on populations instead of individuals, and they offered prevention
programs instead of treatment. The preventive approach pioneered by the public
health movement is now an established and important part of government's
response to physical illness. No longer do we wait for symptoms; instead,
government officials try to alter the conditions that promote those symptoms.
262
A preventive approach to marriage-promotion would aim to reduce the
personal and socioeconomic deficits associated with relationship failure instead of
curing the failure itself. The fact that we know many of the risk factors-and do
258 In 2000, 72% of U.S., 75% of Dutch, almost two-thirds of Swedish, and 61% of Norwegian
families with children were headed by married couples. See Badgett, supra note 257, at 4.
259 In Sweden, 70% of cohabitants marry after the birth of their first child, most of them within
five years. In the Netherlands, although 30% of children are born outside of marriage, only twenty-
one of children under one live with unmarried parents; and by age five, only eleven live with
unmarried parents. Id. at 4.
260 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 21, at 452 tbl.684 (reporting poverty levels during
1980 to 1999).
261 See STATISTICS NORWAY, http://www.ssb.no/barnevemg-en/tab-2004-08-25-06-en.html
(reporting 31,905 children in care in 2000).
262 See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 211, at 107 (synthesizing public health history, data, and
policy recommendations); SCUTCHFIELD & KECK, supra note 211, at 28-35.
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not know how to successfully "treat" those who marry badly or not at all-
suggests that a preventive approach is highly desirable. Because nonmarriage and
relationship failure are associated with other types of family dysfunction, this type
of marriage-promotion effort might also have the capacity to produce a broad array
of benefits within a wide variety of families.263
Thus, just as marriage advocates are right in emphasizing marriage as a
positive influence on adults and children, marriage opponents are also right in
emphasizing social policies that facilitate economic and emotional flourishing for
all. Indeed, in the United States, it is not obvious that government can effectively
promote marriage without such policies.264 These policies do not have the capacity
to bring back the world in which marriage and marital child-bearing were almost
universal. But they may have the capacity to make a difference at the margins.
Certainly, they have the capacity to confer a broad array of other personal and
public benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Marriage and marital childbearing are in decline for reasons that are poorly
understood. Cohabitation sometimes represents informal marriage, but far more
frequently serves as a substitute for being single or a stage in the process of
deciding whether to make a marital commitment. Cohabitation thus is not the
equivalent of marriage, and many marital-status classifications appropriately
divide the married from the unmarried. However, because marital decision making
may be affected by (dis)incentives produced by these classifications, policymakers
face difficult choices in deciding whether, and to what extent, they should revise
statutory classifications to avoid marriage disincentives.
The research evidence shows that marriage is associated with economic and
emotional benefits to both adult partners and their children, but it also shows that
the emotional and health benefits associated with marriage are produced only in
low-conflict, well-functioning relationships. Marriage also provides important
public benefits through its notarial function; ceremonial marriage clearly denotes
the intention to form a durable union and to assume marital roles and
responsibilities, while cohabitation has a range of meanings and often has different
meanings even for the cohabiting pair.
263 For example, high-quality, intensive pre-school education is significantly associated not
only with long-term educational and social advantages, but also with a lower rate of child
maltreatment and teen pregnancy. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EVALUATING HEAD
START: A RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE IMPACT OF THE HEAD START PROGRAM 15-
17 (1999); KIRBY, supra note 2.32, at 5; Arthur J. Reynolds & D. L. Robertson, School-Based Early
Intervention and Later Child Maltreatment in the Chicago Longitudinal Study, 74 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 3, 20 (2003); Arthur J. Reynolds et al., School-Based Early Intervention and Child
Well-Being in the Chicago Longitudinal Study, 82 CHILD WELFARE 633, 652 (2003).
264 But cf Pamela J. Smock, The Wax and Wane of Marriage: Prospects for Marriage in the
21st Century, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 966, 968 (2004) (concluding that the research "data are
powerful in suggesting that economic disadvantage inhibits marriage").
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The evidence thus suggests that the state should avoid classificatory schemes
that penalize formal marriage unless there is evidence showing that the costs of
such avoidance exceed the expected gains. The evidence also supports some
marriage-promotion initiatives, in particular low-cost public education aimed at
preserving low-conflict marriages and deterring nonmarital childbearing. These
initiatives appear to be cost-effective, and they. seem extremely unlikely to do
harm.
In the United States, marriage-promotion initiatives should also be coupled
with policies aimed at reducing the social disadvantages strongly associated with
nonmarital birth and relationship failure. The research data shows that the same
conditions which promote nonmarriage and marital failure also promote an
enormous array of problems in family functioning and outcomes. Indeed, because
of the strong and consistent association between disadvantage and relationship
failure, it is not obvious that the state can effectively promote marriage without
such policies.

